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ABSTRACT
Direct loss and expense is a very important element in construction contracts.
However, due to the imbalance relationship between employer and contractor, direct
loss and expense is taken lightly and often treated as a mere “business decision”.
Direct loss and expense is closely related to Section 74(1) and (2), Contract Act 1950,
which similar to the rule in Hadley v Baxendale. This study is aimed at reducing the
uncertainty and difficulties in the event of claiming direct loss and expense that is
deny under the reason of “remote and indirect loss or damage”. This study is carried
out to determine whether direct loss and expense is related to remoteness of damages
and which limb of rule of Hadley v Baxendale, each head of claims lies under. The
head of claims include loss of profit, finance charges, overheads and loss of
productivity. This study was carried out mainly through documentary analysis of law
journals. It was found that loss of profit falls under both limbs of Hadley v Baxendale.
loss of profit under special circumstance is claimable, provided there is
contemplation at the beginning about such arrangement. The other three head of
claims fall under the first limb of Hadley v Baxendale, claimable if they are cause by
employer’s interruption arising naturally in the course of running a operation. It is
hoped that it may provides some rough ideas or guidelines for the parties in the
construction industry on direct loss and expense.
ABSTRAK
Kerugian dan perbelanjaan secara langsung merupakan satu elemen yang
sangat penting dalam kontrak pembinaan. Walau bagaimanapun, kerugian dan
perbelanjaan secara langsung tidak diambil berat dan sering kali dilayan sebagai
“keputusan perdagangan”, disebabkan hubungan yang tidak seimbang antara majikan
dan kontraktor. Kerugian dan perbelanjaan secara langsung berkait dengan Section
74(1) and (2), Akta Kontrak 1950, yang hampir sama dengan peraturan dalam
Hadley v Baxendale. Kajian ini dijangka dapat megurangkan ketidakpastian dan
kesusahan dalam tuntutan untuk kerugian dan perbelanjaan secara langsung, yang
sering kali ditolak atas alasan bahawa ia adalah “kerosakan yang terpencil dan tidak
langsung”. Kajian ini dijalankan untuk memastikah samada kerugian dan
perbelanjaan secara langsung boleh dikaitkan dengan “keterpencilan sesuatu
kerosakan” dan kedudukan setiap alasan tuntutan di bawah peraturan dalam Hadley
v Baxendale. Alasan-alasan tuntutan termasuk kehilangan keuntungan, faedah
pinjaman, perbelanjaan am dan kehilangan produktiviti. Kajian ini dijalankan
menerusi analisis laporan undang-undang. Didapati kehilangan keuntungan terletak
di bawah kedua-dua bahagian peraturan dalam Hadley v Baxendale, manakala tiga
alasan tuntutan yang lain terletak di bawah bahagian pertama peraturan Hadley v
Baxendale, boleh dituntut sekiranya ia disebabkan oleh majikan, dan berlaku secare
semulajadi mengikut aliran sesuatu operasi. Adalah diharapkan bahawa kajian ini
dapat memberi sedikit pandangan dan paduan kepada pihak-pihak yang terlibat
dalam industri pembinaan berkenaan dengan kerugian dan perbelanjaan secara
langsung.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1  Background of Study
The foundation of remoteness of damage is contained in the judgment of
Alderson B. in the Court of Exchequer in the case of Hadley v. Baxendale1:
“Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken,
the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of
contract should be such as many fairly and reasonably be considered either arising
naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract
itself, or such as many reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of
both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach
of it.”
1 (1854), 9 Exch. 341, p. 354
This statement of the law is generally known as the rule in Hadley v.
Baxandale, and it will be seen that it consists of two branches of sub-rules.
It lays down that damages are recoverable:
1) When they are ‘such as may fairly and reasonably be considered arising
naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things’ from the breach, or
2) When they are ‘such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract’, provided that, in
both cases, they are probable result of the breach.2
Regarding to the second branch of sub-rule, Alderson B. pointed out that,
“But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances were wholly
unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed
to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally,
and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from
such a breach of contract. For, had the special circumstances been known, the
parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract by special terms as
to the damages in that case; and of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive
them.”3
From this it will been seen that liability under the second branch of rule will
depend upon the special circumstances made known to the party in default at the
time he made the contract4.
2 The final words govern both branches: Koufos v. C. Czarnikow, Ltd, [1969] 1A.C. 350
3 (1854), 9 Exch. 341, p. 355
4 A.G. Guest, 1975, “Anson’s Law of Contract 24th Edition-Chapter XVII. Remedies For Breach of
Contract” Oxford University Press, p.533
1.2  Problem Statement
Regarding to compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of
contract, Section 74, Contracts Act 1950 reads:
1) When contract has been broken, the party who suffers by the breach is
entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any
loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of
things from the breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to
be likely to result from the breach of it.
2) Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or
damage sustained by reason of the breach.5
In Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd V Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor.6 Rumah
Nanas Estate Sdn Bhd, the vendor agreed to sell to the plaintiffs, Plenitude Holdings
Sdn Bhd a piece of estate land. The land was purchased for the purpose of
development and the vendor was aware of this fact. The first defendant promised to
obtain a loan for the plaintiffs and gave an undertaking that in the event that he was
unable to do so, the defendants would join the plaintiffs in a joint venture to develop
the land. The purchasers paid a deposit, but failed to pay the balance sum within the
stipulated period. The vendor then terminated the agreement and forfeited the deposit.
The trial judge came to the conclusion that the termination of the agreement by the
vendor was not valid and ordered specific performance of the agreement for the sale
5 Contracts Act 1950 sc.74
6 [1994] 2 MLJ 273
and purchase of the land, with damages to be assessed for wrongful termination and
breach of undertaking. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court which
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the High Court. In this application
for assessment of damages which was made pursuant to the High Court order, the
damages which fell to be assessed were, inter alia, for wrongful termination of the
agreement, loss of profits on the development project and interest on the deposit paid
by the purchaser to the vendor.
The court held that the defendants were fully aware that the plaintiffs had
purchased the land for the purpose of development and that by not honouring their
undertakings, the plaintiffs would be unable to proceed with the development
and thereby suffer loss of profit on the proposed housing project.
  The loss suffered by the plaintiffs was a natural and probable result of the
defendant’s breach of the contract and any loss of profit normally to be expected
which the developer would have earned but for the breach, is an allowable claim
under the rule in Hadley v Baxendale.
The questions arise including:
a) Is in what situation and to what extend, damages are considered “remote
and indirect loss or damage”?
b) Is loss of profit, loss of bargain, and loss of opportunity7 considered as
remote and indirect loss or damages?
c) How efficient local standard forms of contract in claiming the losses
under the second branch of sub-rule in Hadley v. Baxandale?
7 Referred as “the losses”
1.3   Objective of Research
The objectives of the study are:
1. To determine whether direct loss and expense is related to remoteness
of damages.
2. To determine which limb of rule of Hadley v Baxendale, each head of
claims lies under.
1.4   Scope of Study
This research will be focused on following matter:-
1. The related provisions in the standard forms of contract used in Malaysia,
namely, JKR 203A, PAM 98.
2. Court cases related to the issue particularly Malaysian cases. Reference
is also made to cases in other countries such as United Kingdom, Brunei,
Singapore, Australia, and Hong Kong.
1.5   Significance of Study
This study is expected to reduce the uncertainty and difficulties in the
event of claiming direct loss and expense that are deny under the reason of “remote
and indirect loss or damage”. Construction industry stake holders will be more aware
and clear of their position while dealing with remoteness of damages in contracts.
1.6   Methodology
Figure 1.1 Flow of Methodology
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Conclusion






It is that except in the case of a debt, the repayment of which may be
specially enforced at common law, the common law remedy for breach of a
contractual promise is that of damages. In order to established a right to damages, the
first thing a plaintiff must show is that the loss which he sustained is caused by the
breach. But assuming this can be proved, the law will nevertheless, not compel the
defendant to assume liability for all the loss which the plaintiff may conceivably
have suffered as a consequence of the breach.1 Certain losses may be “too remote”,
and for these the plaintiff is not entitled to compensation. Such remoteness of
damage and other “damages principles” should be well studied in order to understand
building contract damages.
1 Guest, A.G. Anson?s Law of Contract 24th Edition. Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1975, p. 531
  Remoteness of damages also often directly related to causation, this as
shown in Hodson L J’s judgement2:
“The only remaining question is whether the damages flow from the breach
in accordance with the ordinary law of damages for breach of contract. Were they
the natural and probable consequences of the breach? If not, they are too
remote?The question is one of causation. If the master, by acting as he did, either
caused the damage by acting unreasonably in the circumstances in which he was
placed, or failed to mitigate the damage, the defendants would be relieved,
accordingly, from the liability which would otherwise have fallen on them?In acting
as he did, obeying the order of the defendants, he was, in my opinion, acting
reasonably in the circumstances and not in such a way as to destroy the chain of
causation between the breach of contract committed by the defendants and the
damage sustained by his ship.”
A breach of building contract which has not been excused, just like
breach of other type of contracts, gives the injured party a right of action for damages.
For case where the breach was proven but no loss was proven, Lord Denning had
there to point out that a judge to award such sum as he thinks proper, as exemplary
damages3:
“?In my opinion a sum awarded by the way of exemplary damages is not to
be weighed in nice scales. It is a question for the judge, having heard all the
evidence, to award such sum as he thinks proper.”4 However, such exemplary
damages are not normally applied in building contracts. In construction industry,
parties are usually more concern about damages recoverable where there is actual
loss.
2 Compania Naviera Maropan S.A. v. Bowaters Lloyd Pulp And Paper Mills Ltd. [1955] 2 QB 68
p. 15
3 [1978] 1 WLR 455 read also Broome v. Cassel [1972] A.C. 1027 for “exemplary damages”
4 Ibid. p. 7
In damages, several terms often brought up such as penalty, actual loss
suffered, liquidated and unliquidated damages. These terms are often well elaborated
in common law cases, for example in Widnes Foundry (1925), Ltd v Cellulose
Acetate Silk Company, Ltd5, the court held that liquidated damages payable by the
party in default cannot be a “penalty” if it is less than the actual loss suffered by the
other party.
To assured that this study has a solid foundation in damages related
principles and issues, it is necessary look deeper into the compensatory nature of
damages, remoteness of damages, the rule in Hadley v Baxendale, and measures of
damages.
2.2   General Principles of Damages
The object of awarding damages for breach of contract is to put the
injured party into the position in which he would have been had the contract been
performed6. Under the Common law damages are awarded to put the plaintiff as
nearly as possible “in the same position as he would have been in if he have not
sustained the wrong for which he is now getting compensation or reparation.”7 To
achieve such objective, first of all, one should understand the compensatory nature of
damages.
5 [1931] 2 KB 393
6 Guest, A.G. Anson?s Law of Contract 24th Edition. Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1975, p. 544
7 Per Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Company (1880) 5 App.Cas. 25
2.2.1  Compensatory Nature of Damages
Generally, damages for breach of contract are compensatory and non-
punitive in nature. Such damages are given by way of compensation for loss suffered,
and not by the way of punishment for wrong inflicted. The measure of damages is
therefore not affected by the motive or manner of the breach.
  Such compensatory nature of damages is well described in Robinson v.
Harman8, where Parke B. said:
  “The rule of the common law is, that where a party sustains a loss by
reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the
same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed.”9
Further adding to this statement was a modern case where Lord Lloyd of
Bewick said:
“This does not mean that in every case of breach of contract the plaintiff can
obtain the monetary equivalent of specific performance. It is first necessary to
ascertain the loss the plaintiff has in fact suffered by reason of the breach. If he has
suffered no loss, as sometimes happens, he can recover no more than nominal
damages. For the object of damages is always to compensate the plaintiff, not to
punish the defendant.”10
8 1 Exch. 850
9 Ibid. p. 855
10Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v. Forsyth [1996] 1 AC 344
Such principle and compensatory of damages are so clear-cut and obvious,
but yet it is in fact surprising how often claims put forward by contractor or their
advisors, or the reasons given by owners for rejecting them, depart from this
fundamental principle, which should be constantly borne in mind when preparing or
reviewing a contractor’s claim.11
“Exemplary” damages are not recoverable in the law of contract.12
Generally, damages for breach of contract will not include an amount to represent
mental suffering such as distress, frustration and anxiety.13 Exceptionally, where the
object of the contract is to provide "pleasure, relaxation, peace of mind or freedom
from molestation" such damages may be awarded.14
2.2.2  Remoteness of Damages
In Hadley v. Baxendale,15 the plaintiffs’ mill was stopped by the breakage of
a crankshaft, and it was necessary  to send the crankshaft to the makers as a pattern
for a new one. The defendants, who are common carriers, Pickford & Co., undertook
to deliver the shaft to the to engineers in Greenwich. A delay of five days in delivery
there was held to be in breach of contract, and the question at issue was the proper
11 Duncan Wallace, I.N. Contruction Contracts:Principles and Policies in Tort and Contract. London
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986 p. 109
12 Guest, A.G. Anson?s Law of Contract 24th Edition. Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1975, p. 544
13 Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488 and Watts v Morrow [1991] 1 WLR 1421
14 see Bliss v South East Thames Regional Health Authority [1987] ICR 700 and Jarvis v Swans Tours
Ltd [1973] QB 233
15 (1854), 9 Exch. 341, p. 354
measure of damages. In fact the shaft was sent as a pattern for a new shaft and until it
arrived the mill could not operate. So the owners claimed £300 as loss of profit for
the five days by which resumption of work was delayed by this breach of contract;
but the carriers did not know that delay would cause loss of this kind.
The foundation of remoteness of damage is contained in the judgment of
Alderson B. in the Court of Exchequer in the case of Hadley v. Baxendale:
“Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the
damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract
should be such as many fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally,
i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or
such as many reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both
parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.”
This statement of the law is generally known as the rule in Hadley v.
Baxandale, and it will be seen that it consists of two branches of sub-rules. It lays
down that damages are recoverable:
1) When they are ‘such as may fairly and reasonably be considered arising
naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things’ from the breach, or
2) When they are ‘such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract’, provided that, in
both cases, they are probable result of the breach.
The rule in Hadley v. Baxandale later further developed by other
cases. One a major reformulation of the rule is in Victoria Laundry (Windsor), Ltd. v.
Newman Industries, Ltd.16 In that particular case, in terms of “reasonably
foreseeability”, Asquith LJ said:
  “(1). This purpose, if relentlessly pursued, would provide him with a
complete indemnity for all loss de facto resulting from a particular breach, however
improbable, however unpredictable. This, in contract at least, is recognised as too
harsh a rule. Hence, (2): In cases of breach of contract the aggrieved party is only
entitled to recover such part of the loss actually resulting as was at the time of the
contract reasonably foreseeable as liable to result from the breach. (3) What was at
that time reasonably foreseeable depends on the knowledge then possessed by the
parties, or, at all events, by the party who later commits the breach. (4) For this
purpose, knowledge "possessed" is of two kinds -- one imputed, the other actual.
Everyone, as a reasonable person, is taken to know the "ordinary course of things"
and consequently what loss is liable to result from a breach in that ordinary course.
This is the subject-matter of the "first rule" in Hadley v. Baxendale (1), but to this
knowledge, which a contract-breaker is assumed to possess whether he actually
possesses it or not, there may have to be added in a particular case knowledge which
he actually possesses of special circumstances outside the "ordinary course of
things" of such a kind that a breach in those special circumstances would be liable to
cause more loss. Such a case attracts the operation of the "second rule" so as to
make additional loss also recoverable. (5) In order to make the contract-breaker
liable under either rule it is not necessary that he should actually have asked himself
what loss is liable to result from a breach. As has often been pointed out, parties at
the time of contracting contemplate, not the breach of the contract, but its
performance. It suffices that, if he had considered the question, he would as a
reasonable man have concluded that the loss in question was liable to result? (6),
Nor, finally, to make a particular loss recoverable, need it be proved that on a given
state of knowledge the defendant could, as a reasonable man, foresee that a breach
16  [1949] 1 All ER 997
must necessarily result in that loss. It is enough if he could foresee it was likely so to
result.” 17
For Malaysian scenario reference can be look into the case Plenitude
Holdings Sdn Bhd V Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor.18 Rumah Nanas Estate Sdn
Bhd, the vendor agreed to sell to the plaintiffs, Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd a piece
of estate land. The land was purchased for the purpose of development and the
vendor was aware of this fact. The first defendant promised to obtain a loan for the
plaintiffs and gave an undertaking that in the event that he was unable to do so, the
defendants would join the plaintiffs in a joint venture to develop the land. The
purchasers paid a deposit, but failed to pay the balance sum within the stipulated
period. The vendor then terminated the agreement and forfeited the deposit. The trial
judge came to the conclusion that the termination of the agreement by the vendor
was not valid and ordered specific performance of the agreement for the sale and
purchase of the land, with damages to be assessed for wrongful termination and
breach of undertaking. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court which
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the High Court. In this application
for assessment of damages which was made pursuant to the High Court order, the
damages which fell to be assessed were, inter alia, for wrongful termination of the
agreement, loss of profits on the development project and interest on the deposit paid
by the purchaser to the vendor.
The court held that the defendants were fully aware that the plaintiffs had
purchased the land for the purpose of development and that by not honouring their
17 [1949] 1 All ER 997 p. 8
18 [1994] 2 MLJ 273
undertakings, the plaintiffs would be unable to proceed with the development
and thereby suffer loss of profit on the proposed housing project.
The case referred to section 74 of the Contracts Act 1950 which states as
follows:
      (1)   When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by the
            breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the
            contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him
            thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from
            the breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the
            contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it.
      (2)   Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect
            loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach.
The loss suffered by the plaintiffs was a natural and probable result of the
defendant’s breach of the contract and any loss of profit normally to be expected
which the developer would have earned but for the breach, is an allowable claim
under the rule in Hadley v Baxendale.
 Further development can later be found in both the first limb and second limb
of Hadley v Baxandale. Generally, since section 74 of the Contract Act 1950 is based
on the rule established in Hadley v Baxendale, the boundary established under the
common law cases are reliable guidance and sometimes binding for Malaysian
scenario.
2.2.2.1  First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale
In Horne And Anor v Midland Railway Company,19 the plaintiff being under
contract to deliver military shoes in London for the French army at an unusually high
price by a particular day, delivered to the defendants to be carried, with the notice of
the contract only as to the date of delivery. The shoes were delayed in carriage, and
were consequently rejected by the intending purchasers. The plaintiff sought to
recover, in addition to the ordinary loss for delay, the difference between price at
which the shoes were actually sold and the high price at which they would have been
sold if they have punctually delivered.
The court held that such damages do not fall into the  the first limb of Hadley
v Baxendale, and Kelly, C.B in his judgement said:20
“I do not think, in the absence of any expressed or implied contract by the
company to be liable to these damages, that there could be any such liability imposed
upon them. But however this may be, and even assuming that there might be such a
notice as would render the company liable to the exceptional damages claimed by
the plaintiffs, I am clearly of opinion that the intimation given to the company in this
case does not amount to such a notice. It certainly gave the defendants notice of what
might probably be assumed to be the case without express notice, viz., that the
plaintiffs being under contract to deliver the shoes, would have them thrown on their
hands if not delivered in due time, but it gave the defendants no notice of the
exceptional nature of the contract and the unusual loss that would result from a
breach of it. That being so, the case comes within the principle clearly to be deduced
from all the authorities (not excepting the case of Hadley v. Baxendale itself,
whatever view may be taken of the dictum in that case with respect to the effect of
19 [L R] 8 C P 131
20 Ibid.
notice) viz., that the damages for a breach of contract must be such as may fairly and
reasonably be considered as arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of
things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may be reasonably supposed to
have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as
the probable result of the breach of it?
  We are not told when the contract for the sale of the shoes was made,
nor what was the market price at that time. It appears to me, therefore, that the only
damage we can consider is the difference between the market price at the time when
the goods ought to have been delivered and the market price at the time when they
were delivered. There is no evidence before us to shew that the market value of the
shoes at the time when they were delivered to the defendants or at the time when they
ought to have been delivered to the consignees, differed from their value at the time
when they were ultimately sold. So far as appears from the case, it seems to me that
it must be taken that the market price was the same at all those periods. Under those
circumstances, in the absence of any notice to the defendants of the exceptional
nature of the contract into which the plaintiffs had entered, I think the plaintiffs are
only entitled to nominal damages, unless, perhaps, in respect of expenses, if any, that
were incurred, which would be amply covered by the amount paid into court.”21
After the case of Victoria Laundry (Windsor), Ltd. v. Newman
Industries, Ltd.22, the case of The Heron II. Koufos v. C. Czarnikow, Ltd.23 add
further elaboration to the first limb of Hadley v baxendale.
  In this particular case, the respondents chartered the appellant
shipowner's vessel, the Heron II, for the carriage of three thousand tons of sugar by
21  [L R] 8 C P 131 p. 8
22 [1949] 1 All ER 997
23 [1969] 1 AC 350
sea with the intention of selling the sugar on arrival at Basrah, the port of destination.
The time that the voyage would take could be predicted with reasonable certainty to
be twenty days. The vessel made deviations in breach of contract, which resulted in a
delay of nine days. If there had not been this delay, the sugar would have fetched
£32 10s. per ton instead of the £31 2s. 9d. per ton that was realised. The shipowner
did not know of the charterers' intention, but he knew that there was a market for
sugar at Basrah. If the shipowner had thought about the matter, he must have realised
that it was not unlikely that the sugar would be sold on arrival at the then market
price, and that prices were apt to fluctuate daily. He had no reason to suppose that the
fluctuation would be downwards rather than upwards. The charterers sought to
recover the difference between the amount that would have been realised on sale at
£32 10s. per ton and the amount realised in fact, as damages for breach of the
contract of carriage by delay due to deviation.
  Later, the court held that the loss of profit was recoverable as damages
for breach of the contract of carriage by deviation involving delay because, on the
knowledge available to the shipowner when the contract was made, the sale of the
sugar in Basrah market on the ship's arrival was something of which there was such
probability that it should be regarded by the court as arising in the usual course of
things and as being within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract.
In his judgement, Lord Upjohn said:
“It is perfectly true that at the time of the contract nothing was said as to the
purpose for which the charterer wanted the sugar delivered at Basrah; he might have
wanted to do so to stock up his supply of sugar or to carry out a contract already
entered into which had nothing to do with the market at Basrah; or he might sell it
during the voyage, but all that is pure speculation. It seems to me that on the facts of
this case the parties must be assumed to have contemplated that there would be a
punctual delivery to the port of discharge and that port having a market in sugar
there was a real danger that as a result of a delay in breach of contract the charterer
would miss the market and would suffer loss accordingly. It being established that
the goods were in fact destined for the market the shipowner is liable for that loss.”24
  On the other hand, regarding the relation of chance and things
resulting in the nature course of events, Lord Pearce said:
“I do not think that Aldersin, B., was directing his mind to whether
something resulting in the natural course of events was an odds-on chance or not. A
thing may be a natural (or even an obvious) result even though the odds are against
it. Suppose a contractor was employed to repair the ceiling of one of the law courts
and did it so negligently that it collapsed on the heads of those in court. I should be
inclined to think that any tribunal (including Alderson, B., himself) would have found
as a fact that the damage arose "naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of
things". Yet if one takes into account the nights, week ends, and vacations, when the
ceiling might have collapsed, the odds against it collapsing on top of anybody's head
are nearly ten to one. I do not believe that this aspect of the matter was fully
considered and worked out in the judgment. He was thinking of causation and type of
consequence rather than of odds.”25
In a much modern Scottish case, the question of reasonable
foreseeability of loss can be a difficult matter in circumstances, as for example in
Balfour Beatty Costruction (Scotland) Ltd v. Scottish Power.26 Balfour Beatty was
building a by-pass near Edinburgh in 1985 and also had to build an aqueduct to
divert a canal. They had contracted with the electricity board for the supply of
electricity to operate a concrete batching plant. During the course of building the
aqueduct, which required a continuous pour operation, the batching plant stopped
24 [1969] 1 AC 350 p. 57
25 [1969] 1 AC 350 p. 44
26 1994 S.L.T 807
working as a result of power cut and what had been built required to e demolished at
a cost of £229,000. In an action of damages for breach of contract brought by the
construction company against the successors of the electricity board, it was
established that the electricity supply had been interrupted and that the interruption
was a breach of contract by the electricity board. The construction company claimed
the cost of demolishing and rebuilding a substantial part of their construction works,
this having been rendered necessary by the interruption of the electricity supply and
the consequent interruption of the required continuous pour. The Outer House said
that these damages were too remote.27
On appeal the Firs Division reversed this,28 but the Lords upheld the
Outer House in finding such damages under the first limb of Hadley v Baxendale
were not reasonably foreseeable. Regarding the issue of foreseeability and awareness
special consequences, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, in his judgement said:
“My Lords, in my view the Second Division were in error in imputing to the
board, at the time of entering into the contract, technical knowledge of the details of
concrete construction with which they had not been furnished by Balfour Beatty. I
am prepared to accept that as a matter of general knowledge the board would have
appreciated that concrete poured would ultimately harden. I do not, however,
consider that the board had any reason to be aware of the importance of the time
involved in the hardening process, nor of the consequences of adding freshly poured
concrete to that which had already hardened. Indeed, the board had no reason to
expect that concrete would be required for the construction of a watertight
aqueduct.”29
27 1992 S.L.T 811
28 1993 S.L.T 1005
29 1994 S.L.T 807 p.8
The rule lay down in the first limb of Hadley v Baxendale, is similar
to what written down in Section 74(1) Contract Act 1950 when a contract has been
broken, the party who suffers by the breach is entitled to receive, from the party who
has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby,
which naturally arose in the usual course of things from the breach, or which the
parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it.
And any damages not too remote can be awarded under first limb of Hadley v
Baxendale.
2.2.2.2  Second Limb of Hadley v Baxendale
The first limb of the rule contains the necessity for knowledge of
certain basic facts upon the basis of which there is a “horizon of contemplation”.30
Beyond such “horizon of contemplation”, additional or "special" knowledge,
however, may extend the horizon to include losses that are outside the natural course
of events; and of course the extension of the horizon need not always increase the
damages; it might introduce a knowledge of particular circumstances, e.g., a
subcontract, which show that the plaintiff would in fact suffer less damage than a
more limited view of the circumstances might lead one to expect.31
 Lord Pearce further explained:
“According to whether one categorises a fact as basic knowledge or special
knowledge the case may come under the first part of the rule or the second. For that
30 Keating, D. Keating on Building Contracts 5th Edition.London Sweet & Maxwell, 1991, p. 188
31 Per Lord Pearce in The Heron II. Koufos v. C. Czarnikow, Ltd. [1969] 1 AC 350
reason there is sometimes difference of opinion as to which is the part which governs
a particular case, and it may be that both parts govern it.”32
  As mentioned above, the application of this second branch of the rule
depends upon the knowledge which the contract-breaker possesses at the time of the
contract, of special circumstances outside the “ordinary course of things”, of such a
kind that a breach in those circumstances will cause more loss.33
In a Malaysian case, Eikobina (M) Sdn Bhd V Mensa Mercantile (Far East)
Pte Ltd,34 the vendor agreed to sell the buyer 24 units of heavy construction
equipment ('the goods'). After the agreement was entered into but before delivery of
the goods, the buyer resold 15 units to sub-buyers, leaving nine units unsold. On 27
July 1987, the date of delivery of the goods, the vendor failed to deliver the goods
and the buyer sued for: (i) specific performance of the agreement; (ii) general
damages for breach of contract; and (iii) damages for loss of agency to sell other
units of similar goods ('the other units') for the vendor. The claim was disputed by
the vendor who also counterclaimed for work done and materials supplied. The trial
judge found for the buyer but declined to grant specific performance, awarding
instead damages for breach of contract and at the same time dismissing the
counterclaim of the vendor.  The buyer's and vendor's appeals to the Supreme Court
were dismissed and the decision of the trial judge confirmed, the court upholding the
order for the vendor to pay the buyer: (a) general damages for breach of contract; and
(b) damages 'on the loss of agency rights' over the other units. The damages fell to be
assessed by a registrar of the High Court. The registrar awarded damages for: (i) loss
of profit at RM1,766,429 based on the market price of the goods on a date other than
the date of breach; (ii) loss of commission; and (iii) loss of opportunity due to loss of
32 Ibid.
33 Guest, A.G. Anson?s Law of Contract 24th Edition. Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1975, p. 542
34 [1994] 1 MLJ 553
confidence in the buyer on the part of its business associates and customers. On
appeal by the vendor before the trial judge, the damages awarded were confirmed
except that the loss of commission was reduced from RM150,000 to RM120,000. In
this appeal, the vendor abandoned the part of the appeal as related to the loss of
commission while the appeal against the other two heads were vigorously pursued.
  The court held that after liability on a contract is established, two questions
are involved in the assessment of damages. The first is that no compensation can be
awarded for damage that is too remote and the second is that in assessing damage
that is not too remote, the correct measure of damages must be adopted. In this case,
the registrar had totally failed to apply his mind to the question of the remoteness of
damages. The matter of sub-sales was not communicated to the vendor at the time of
the contract. Thus the loss of profit on 15 units of the goods sold before delivery and
after contract could not be claimed as it was too remote rules in Hadley v
Baxendale,35 since the special circumstance rendered by the sub-sales was not in
contemplation.
In Simpson v The London And North Western Railway Company36, the
plaintiff, a manufacturer, who was in the habit of attending at agricultural shows to
exhibit samples of his goods, and made profit by the practice. After exhibiting in a
show at Bedford, he entrusted some of his samples to an agent of the defendant
company for carriage to a show ground at Newcastle. On the consignment note he
wrote: “Must be at Newcastle Monday certain.” Owing to a default on the apart of
the company, the samples arrived late for the Newcastle show. The plaintiff therefore
claimed damages for his loss of profit at the show. The court held that drawing the
inference of fact that the railway company’s agent had knowledge of the special
35 [1994] 1 MLJ 553
36 1 QB D 274
circumstances, and the purpose of the plaintiff to exhibit was within the
contemplation of the parties to the contract, that the plaintiff was entitled to the
damages, on the ground that loss of profit was a natural and probable result of the
failure of that purpose; and that no evidence was necessary of his prospect of making
profit at the particular show in question.37
While giving his judgment, Cockburn CJ said:38
“?the principle is now settled that, whenever either the object of the sender
is specially brought to the notice of the carrier, or circumstances are known to the
carrier from which the object ought in reason to be inferred, so that the object may
be taken to have been within the contemplation of both parties, damages may be
recovered for the natural consequences of the failure of that object. The plaintiff in
the present case is in the habit of going about the country exhibiting his cattle spice
at shows, to attract purchasers. The defendants had an agent on the ground at the
Bedford agricultural show, where this contract was made, for the purpose of
drawing custom to their line; and their agent must have known that the plaintiff had
been exhibiting these goods, and that they were being sent to Newcastle for the same
purpose. I, therefore, cannot doubt that there was in this case common knowledge of
the object in view. As to the supposed impossibility of ascertaining the damages, I
think there is no such impossibility; to some extent, no doubt, they must be matter of
speculation, but that is no reason for not awarding any damages at all.”39
37 1 QB D 274
38 Simpson v The London And North Western Railway Company1 QB D 274 p. 5
39 Ibid.
Again, contemplation of special knowledge is of an essential matter in
second branch of Hadley v Baxendale, and can be seen in Simon v Pawson and Leafs,
Ltd40 , where Slesser LJ said:
“The whole matter is one entirely of speculation, and I find it quite
impossible to say that the alleged loss was in fact actually in the contemplation, or
ought to be taken to have been in the contemplation, of the wholesaler at the time of
making the contract as a reasonable consequence of his breach and within the
meaning of the third rule enounced in Hadley v Baxendale.”41
It is usually said that ‘bare knowledge’ of the circumstances surrounding the
contract is sufficient to make the contract liable.42 But there is some authority for the
view that he should , I addition, either expressly or impliedly have contracted to
assume liability for the exceptional loss in special circumstances.43 On this view, the
mere communication to a party of the existence of special circumstances is not
enough: there must be smething to show that the contract was made on the terms that
the defendant was to liable for the loss.44 However, this view cannot be supported.
No doubt a casual intimation would not suffice. For the special circumstances must
be disclosed in such a manner as to render it fair inference of fact hat both parties
contemplated the exceptional loss as probable result of the breach. But however, it is
quite unnecessary that it should be a term in the contract.45
In H Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd46, the court held that
40 [1932] All ER Rep 72
41 [1932] All ER Rep 72 p.13
42 Patrick v Russo-British Grain Export.,Ltd  [1972] 2 K.B. 535 per Salter J.
43 Guest, A.G. Anson?s Law of Contract 24th Edition. Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1975, p. 543
44 Refer British Columbia and Vancouver's Island Spar, Lumber and Saw Mill Co Ltd v Nettleship
[L R] 3 C P 499
45 Guest, A.G. Anson?s Law of Contract 24th Edition. Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1975, p. 543
46 [1978] 1 All ER 525
in breach of contract a distinction was to be drawn between cases in which the
plaintiff had suffered physical injury to his person or property and cases in which he
had suffered only economic loss. In the case of physical injury the test of the
recoverability of damages was the same as in tort and the defendant was liable for all
damage which could reasonably have been foreseen at the date of the breach as a
possible consequence of the breach, even if the possibility was only slight. In the
case of economic loss, the defendant was liable only if the damage was such that at
the time of the contract he could reasonably have contemplated it as a serious
possibility in the event of a breach occurring. Applying those tests, the defendants
were liable for the physical injury suffered by the plaintiffs, i e the death and
sickness of the pigs, for they ought reasonably to have foreseen that if mouldy nuts
were fed to the pigs there was a possibility that they might become ill; the fact that
the infection which had occurred was far worse than any illness which could
reasonably have been foreseen by them at the date of the breach did not lessen their
liability since the type or kind of damage which in fact occurred had been foreseen as
a possibility. They were not, however, liable for the loss of profits from future sales
of pigs for the serious possibility that such loss would occur was not within their
reasonable contemplation at the time of the contract”47
The court further held that loss which could be contemplated was of the type
which had in fact occurred, then the defendant was liable the quantum was much
greater. For a plaintiff's loss to be recoverable in an action for damages for breach of
contract, it was sufficient if loss of the type which in fact occurred could reasonably
be supposed to have been in the parties' contemplation as a serious possibility in the
event of the breach which in fact occurred, and it was not necessary that the parties
should have had it within their contemplation that the loss which in fact occurred was
likely to occur in the event of a breach. The question of what amounted to a 'serious
47 [1978] 1 All ER 525 per Lord Denning MR, Orr and Scarman LJJ dissenting
possibility' was a question of fact to be decided by the application of common sense
to the particular circumstances. Provided that the loss which could be contemplated
was of the type which had in fact occurred, the defendant was liable for the whole of
the loss although the quantum was greater than the parties might have contemplated.
That rule applied to both physical loss to the plaintiff's person or property and to loss
of profit.48
 The principles applied in this case may well relevant in building contract
cases in relation to defect in the works or effective material.
2.3  Measures of Damages
On the question of the measures of damage, courts took as their startin
point the general principal in contract cases as stated by Parke B.49, namely that
plaintiff is entitled to be placed, as far as money can do it, in the same situation as he
would have been had the contract been performed. In Bevan,  Richmond P. held that
in building cases this meant that prima facie measure of damage would be such
reconstruction as would be necessary to produce conformity with the contract, unless
this was unreasonable. 50
48 [1978] 1 All ER 525 p. 3
49 Robinson v. Harman 1 Exch. 850
50 Duncan Wallace, I.N. Contruction Contracts:Principles and Policies in Tort and Contract. London
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986 p. 174
 Again on the measure of damage, Oliver J. in Radford, faced with the
contention that, in cases where the building was to e build on the defendan’s land the
measure shold be the reduction of value (if any) in the plaintiff’s land, held hat the
underlying compensation principle in Parke B.’s formulation in Robinson v Harman
was the only general rule which could be applied.51  In applying the principle, the
court  used its common sense in measuring, in the case of individual plaintiff and by
reference to his particular circumstances, what he had lost by the breach. The
defendant’s contention that the measures was reduction in value in effect treated the
words “in the same situation” in Parke B.’s formulation, when applied to an owner of
dominant land like the plaintiff, as being “in the same financial situation,” so that the
plaintiff’s hopes and expectations from the contract would be a relevant
consideration only insofar as there might be some deterioration of or failure to
ameliorate his financial situation resulting from the breach.
After reviewing the authorities, Oliver J. came to the conclusion were cases
where the plaintiff had as a fact no intention or need to rebuild. In he case before him
he was satisfied that the plaintiff had a genuine desire and intention to build the wall.
Furthermore, it was not unreasonable for him to do so, and to do so on his own land
if he was unable to enter the land of the new owner for the purpose. The fact that he
was a reversioner of investment property let to tenants, and an occupier only of the
garden, was also irrelevant since he genuinely intended to confer the benefit of the
wall on his tenants, who had the use of the garden. In the course of his judgment of
damage, Oliver J. made interesting observation (applicable equally perhaps, to the
question of the date for assessment) that while the measure of damage and the duty to
mitigate might be logically distinct concepts to some extent they were mirror images,
particularly in cases of contract, for the measure of damage could arrive at only by
postulating what the particular plaintiff could reasonably do to alleviate his loss and
51 Ibid.
what would be the cost to him of doing so at time when he could reasonably be
expected to do it. 52
In the case of The Heron II. Koufos v. C. Czarnikow, Ltd.53, it was held that:
“the measure of damages in contract and the measure of damages in tort are
not the same, for in contract there is opportunity for the injured party to protect
himself against a particular risk by directing the other party's attention to it before the
contract is made, but in tort there is no such opportunity and a torfeasor cannot
reasonably complain if he had to pay for unusual but foreseeable damage resulting
from his wrongdoing”54
Regarding the limitation of damages, Blackburn, J in Cory And Others v The
Thames Ironwrks And Shipbuilding Company, Ltd,55 said:
“The measure of damages when a party has not fulfilled his contract is what
might be reasonably expected in the ordinary course of things to flow from the non-
fulfilment of the contract, not more than that, but what might be reasonably expected
to flow from the non-fulfilment of the contract in the ordinary state of things, and to
be the natural consequences of it. The reason why the damages are confined to that is,
I think, pretty obvious, viz. that if the damage were exceptional and unnatural
damage, to be made liable for that would be hard upon the seller,  because if he had
known what the consequence would be he would probably have stipulated for more
time, or, at all events, have used greater exertions if he knew that that extreme
mischief would follow from the non-fulfilment of his contract. On the other hand, if
52 Duncan Wallace, I.N. Contruction Contracts:Principles and Policies in Tort and Contract. London
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986 p. 175
53 [1969] 1 AC 350
54 [1969] 1 AC 350 Per Lord Reid, Lord Hodson, Lord Pearce and Lord Upjohn
55 [L R] 3 QB 181
the party has knowledge of circumstances which would make the damages more
extensive than they would be in an ordinary case, he would be liable to the special
consequences, because he has knowledge of the circumstances which would make
the natural consequences greater than in the other case.”
CHAPTER 3
DIRECT LOSS AND EXPENSE
3.1   Introduction
Work carried out as described in, or as reasonably to be inferred from,
the contract documents provides no basis for a claim.1 The contractor is deemed in
law to be experienced and hence to be liable to foresee, at the time of making the
contract , what the average experienced contractor could foresee as being likely to be
required in the performance of that contract. Thus it follows that in order to establish
a contractual claim the contractor must able to show that the work he was required to
do, or the conditions under which he was required to do it, differed in some way
from what he expected, or should have expected, at the time of making the contract.2
1 Powell-Smith V. and Stephenson D. Civil Engineering Claims Third Edition. Blackwell Science,
1999, p.45
2 Ibid. p. 45
The money claims clauses of most standard form contracts use the
phrase “direct loss and or/expense” when dealing with the contractor’s entitlement to
payment for prolongation or disruption costs.3
The phrase “direct loss and/or expense” is best considered separately
as “direct loss” and “direct expense”. The word “loss” is often used in the courts to
include both loss of money which ought to have been receive and expenditure of
money which ought not to have been received and expenditure of money which
ought not to have been expended. The addition of the odd conjunction “and/or”
seems to have been made simply to remove any possible doubt as to the scope of
contractor’s entitlement4.
A contractor is, of course, entitled under the contract to be paid for work
done, including where appropriate the ascertained value of any variations which are
ordered. In addition, the contractor may be able to make other claims against the
employer. Other than claims which relate to an extension of the contractual time for
completion, there are also claims which, if successful, will result in the employer
having to pay money to the contractor.5
In London Borough of Merton v. Stanley Hugh Leach Ltd6 , a contract was
made in 1972 in the JCT Standard Form, 1963 Edition, 1971 Revision. Disputes
arose concerning, inter alia, delay in completion and claims for loss and expense
3 Powell-Smith, V. and Sims, J. Building Contract Claims. Granada Publishing, 1983, p. 99
4 Keating, D. Building Contracts 4th Edition.London Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, p. 317
5 Murdoch, J and Hughes, W. Construction Contracts Law and Management. E & FN Spon, 1992, p.
183
6 32 Build LR 51
which were referred to arbitration. The contractor contended that the delay was
almost wholly due to want of diligence and care and lack of co-operation on the part
of Merton's architect whereby Merton had broken certain implied terms of the
contract and/or were liable under clauses 11 and/or 24 of the JCT Form. Later, the
court held that there was an implied term that Merton would not hinder or prevent the
contractor from carrying out its obligations in accordance with the terms of the
contract and from executing the work in a regular and orderly manner. 7  Such
implied responsibility for not hindering or cause disruption to other party from
carrying out their obligations was expressed in a well-known passage in the speech
of Lord Blackburn8:
“ Where in a written contract it appears that both parties have agreed that
something should be done which cannot effectively be done unless both concur in
doing it, the construction of the contract is that each agrees to do all that is
necessary to be done on his part for the carrying out of that thing though there may
be no express words to that effect” Thus, when hindrance or disruption is at
employer’s fault, apart from additional project specific costs a contractor's loss and
expense claim for delay and disruption is commonly brought under the following
heads9:
? loss of profit;
? finance charges;
? overheads;
? loss of productivity or uneconomic working
7 32 Build LR 51
8 MacKay v Dick [1881] 6 AC 251, p. 263
9 Mallesons Stephen Jaques. What does “loss and expense” mean? Asian Projects and Construction
Update -8 March 2003
url:
http://www.mallesons.com/publications/Asian_Projects_and_Construction_Update/6366696W.htm
3.2   Standard Form Provisions
Generally, various standard forms of contract for contract industry
have so called “loss and expense” clauses. These clauses have essential influence to
direct loss expense since they may differ slightly or drastically.
PAM 1998. Clause 24.1 Loss and/or Expense Caused By Disturbance
of Regular Progress Of The Works.
“If and when the Contractor notifies the Architect in writing that regular
progress of the Works or any part of it has been or is likely be materially affected
and that he had incurred or is likely to incur direct loss and/or expense fro which he
would not be reimbursed by a payment under any other provision of this Contract
then the Architect or the Quantity Surveyor as instructed by the Architect shall as
and when necessary from time to time ascertain the amount of such loss and/or
expense which had been incurred by the contractor.”
PAM 2005. Clause 24.1 Loss and/or Expense Caused By Disturbance of
Regular Progress Of The Works.
“Where the regular progress of the works or any section of the Work has
been or is likely to be materially affected by only the matters specifically referred to
in Clause 24.3 and the Contractor has incurred or is likely to incur loss and/or
expense which could not be reimbursed by a payment made under any other
provision in this Contract, the Contractor may make a claim for such loss and/or
expense.”
  JKR FORM 203A (Rev. 10/83). Clause 44. Loss and Expense
Caused By Delays.
  “If the regular progress of the Works or any part thereof has been
materially affected by reason as stated under Clause 43(c ), (f) or (i) hereof (and no
other), and the contractor has incurred direct loss and or expense for which he
would not be reimbursed by a payment made under any other provision in this
Contract, then the contractor  shall within one (1) month of the occurance of such
event of circumstance give notice in writing to the SO of his intention to claim for
such direct loss and/or expense, subject always to Clause 48 hereof.”
JCT 1998. Clause 26.1.  Loss and Expense caused by Matters
Affecting Regular progress of the Works.
  “If the contractor makes written application to the Architect stating
that he has incurred or is likely to incur direct loss and/or expense (of which the
Contractor may give his quantification in the execution of this Contract due to
deferment of giving possession of the site? or because the regular progress of the
Works or of any part  thereof has been or is likely to be materially affected by any
one or more of the matters referred to in clause 26.2; and if and as soon as the
Architect is of the opinion that the direct loss and/or expense has been incurred or is
likely to be incurred due to any such deferment of giving possession or that the
regular progress of the Works or any part thereof has been so or is likely to be so
materially affected as set out in the application of the Contractor then the Architect
from time to time thereafter shall ascertain, or shall instruct he Quantity Surveyor to
ascertain, the amount of such loss and/or expense which has been or is being
incurred by the contractor.”
  RIBA STANDARD FORM OF CONTRACT. Clause 24. Loss and
Exoense Caused by Disturbance of Regular Progress of The works.
  “If upon written application being made to him by the Contractor the
Architect/Supervising Officer is of the opinion that the Contractor has been involved
in direct loss and/or expense for which he would not be reimbursed by a payment
made under any other provision in this Contract by reason of the regular progress of
the Works?”
3.3   Delay and Disruption By Employer
The classic element in a contractor’s claim which gives rise to most
difficulty arises where delay in completion or disturbance of economic working has
been caused, whether by the owner’s breaches of contract, or by late or numerous
variations. Either of these can be present by themselves, though often they will be
present together. He most common breach by an owner or his advisers are, of course,
lateness in supplying necessary instructions and information, or failure to afford
undisturbed possession wen required. Less common breaches may include delays
caused by other contractors (some-times only a sub-branch of the general
undisturbed possession obligation). Delay and disturbance may also, of course, be
caused by late, akward or very substantial variations of one kind or another.10
  Talking about disturbance, many serious breaches or substantial
variations may involve neither delay nor disturbance beyond their immediate direct
10 Duncan Wallace, I.N. Contruction Contracts:Principles and Policies in Tort and Contract. London
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986 p. 115
cost. They may not be on critical path of progress, so overall delay will not be
involved. They may take place at a time when prompt action and direct expenditure
by the contractor avoid any disturbance of the remaining work. Nevertheless, even
other overall delay is not involved; there will be often serious disturbance of the
contractor’s internal programme. This is particularly true of information or access
breach.11
Even in the absence of immediate direct costs, labour cannot be suddenly
hired or fired, specific tasks cannot be suddenly stopped and restarted, and labour
and plant cannot be moved backwards and forwards across the site, without an often
substantial general loss of productivity. This will express itself, of course, in a
generally heavier labour and plant expenditure, relative to actual work done. This
may result from he particular plant and labour force being engaged for a longer
period, or the recruitment of additional plant and labour to avoid or recover delay.12
The term disruption is one synonymous with construction claims. Disruption
in its simplest sense is the loss of productivity; a reduction in the output of
construction resources, those being, primarily, labours and plant. Disruption costs
may be distinguished from prolongation costs by virtue of the fact that the latter are a
function of time. Disruption costs on the other hand are essentially production related
and as such are often very difficult to prove. Some contractors have sensibly
implemented the use of daily ‘disruption schedules’ to record disruption at site level
as it occurs. 13
11 Duncan Wallace, I.N. Contruction Contracts:Principles and Policies in Tort and Contract. London
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986 p. 124
12 Ibid. p. 124
13 Rae, S.W. Disruption: Counting the Cost. James R Knowles (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, 2005
url: http://www.knowles-seasia.com/articles/Disruption.htm
These schedules record, for instance, that access to a particular area was not
available on the date or in the condition specified and that as a result, labour and
plant were left idle for a noted period of time; or that a site instruction was received
which required labour to be diverted to another task resulting in noted periods
additional demobilisation / re-mobilisation time.14
Generally, the contractor is only able to recover disruption compensation to
the extent that the employer causes the disruption. Although many standard contracts
do not deal expressly with disruption, a contractor should maintain good site records
to assist the contract administrator to make proper assessments of disruption15.
Regarding to JCT 80 provision16, Murdoch mentioned it should be noted that
the contractor entitlement to claim is in no way linked to delay in completion of the
work; all that matters is that the contractor “regular process “has been disrupted in a
way which causes loss or expense.17 Such matters that caused the regular process of
work been or likely to be materially affected are being further stated in the
provisions.18
14 Rae, S.W. Disruption: Counting the Cost. James R Knowles (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, 2005
15 Robinson, A.A. The Society of Construction Law Delay and Disruption Protocol. Construction
Breakfast Seminar29 October 2004. p 3
url: http://www.aar.com.au/pubs/pdf/const/pap29oct04.pdf
16 JCT 80 cl 26
17 Murdoch, J and Hughes, W. Construction Contracts Law and Management. E & FN Spon, 1992, p.
185
18 JCT 80 cl 26.2, cl 26.2.1-cl 26.2.7
In Amec Building Ltd v Cadmus Investment Co Ltd19, decision of an arbitrator
was made not rejecting a global claim outright but had, at the invitation of counsel
for both parties, required substantial further particularisation of Amec's claims.
Regarding a particular head claim under “Escalator Cladding” the judge agree that
the claim did not fail because of a rejection of the global approach but because the
arbitrator concluded that in fact there was no evidence of a disruption20.
In a Scottish case John Doyle Construction Ltd Pursuers (Respondents) v
Laing Management (Scotland) Ltf Defenders (Reclaimers)21, where The pursuers
were appointed works contractors in terms of a contract in the amended form of the
Scottish Works Contract (March 1988). The defenders were the management
contractors. Later, the pursuers sought decrees ordaining the defenders to procure the
ascertainment of the pursuers' loss and expense incurred in consequence of delay and
disruption in the completion of the contract works, to procure the final adjustment of
the contract sum, and for the payment. Defenders claimed that the pursuers' claim for
loss and expense amounted to a global claim, and the success of a global claim was
perilled on the proposition that all of the causal factors were matters for which the
defenders were legally responsible. At debate in the Commercial Court they argued
that the pursuers' averments were irrelevant but the judge held that the averments in
support of the claim for loss and expense were relevant, and allowed a proof before
answer. The defenders reclaimed. The reclaiming motion had been refused and proof
before answer allowed by the court22.
19 51 ConLR 105
20 51 ConLR 105 p 12
21 2004 SCLR 872
22 2004 SCLR 872
Therefore, disruption can be a valid reason entitled to claim however there
must be proof of disruption cause by the employer. Usually, contractor’s claim for
delay and disruption are commonly brought under several heads of claim which will
be discussed later. Such claim are often for commercial or other reasons greatly
exaggerated both as to the extent of delay caused by the employer’s breach and in
quantification which ignoring the damages are to compensate for actual loss and
must be proved.23
3.4   Loss and Expense
During the carrying out of building contracts, particularly if they are
complicated, it is common for Contractor to suffer, or to allege that they suffer,
disturbance in the regular progress of the Work due to causes within the the
Employer’s or the Architect’s control. With With highly paid staff and costly
machines, such losses can be heavy.24
The meaning of the term “loss and expense” is determined using the
common law rules for assessment of damages for breach of contract. According to
the general principles stated in Hadley v Baxendale25, damages for breach of contract
may be recovered if:
23 Keating, D. Building Contracts 4th Edition.London Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, p. 209
24 Ibid. p 582
25 (1854) 156 ER 145.
– they arise naturally from the breach, according to the usual course of
things (direct damages); or
– they may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of
both parties at the time they made the contract as the probable result of
breach (indirect/consequential damages).
3.4.1  Direct Loss
Regarding to loss and expense, usually majority of the standard form
of contracts have the limitation covering only direct damages and direct expense. For
example in The JCT Standard Form of Building Contract, the loss and expense reads:
  “If the contractor makes written application to the Architect/ the
Contract Administration stating  that he has incurred or is likely to incur direct loss
and/or expense in the execution of this Contract for which he would not reimbursed
by a payment under any other provision in this Contract due to deferment of giving
possession of the site? because the regular progress of the Work or any part thereof
has been or is likely to be materially affected by one or more of the matters referred
to in clause 26.2; and if and as soon as the Architect/the Contract Administrator is of
the opinion that the direct loss and/or expense has been incurred or is likely to be
incurred due to any such deferment of giving possession or that the regular progress
of he Work or any part thereof has been likely to be so materially affected as set out
in the application of the Contractor then the Architect/the Contract Administrator
from time to time thereafter shall ascertain, or shall instruct the Quantity Surveyor to
ascertain, the amount of such loss and/or expense which has been or is being
incurred by the contactor?”26
  The degree of certainty between the parties as to their likely exposure
to risk than in attempting to predict how the courts the courts will interpret the
recurringly difficult task in practice of deciding what losses flow naturally from a
breach of contract as general damages, and what special damages might apply, on the
principles classically expressed in Hadley v Baxendale is of great importance. 27 On
the principles of Hadley v Baxendale, Bell said:
  “The general rule is, that if one bound absolutely becomes, without
fraud or fault, unable to fulfil his engagement, damages are due; the damages being
the indemnification for that which the oblige has directly lost or been prevented from
graining, with the expense of proceedings for obtaining reparation. Whenever a
breach of contract is proved, damages follow, although if no loss or inconvenience
be proved the damages will be nominal. Under such claim for damage will fall lawful
interest in pecuniary obligations, as the damage for money not paid: the loss
sustained on the thing itself or foreseen, or naturally in the contemplation of the
parties as the natural result or consequence to be reasonably expected from the
breach: But not collateral or consequential damage; unless either such damage has
by special stipulation of the parties, been brought into view; or unless it be a loss on
he thing itself, as by the rise or fall of markets.”28
Regarding what one means by "direct damage", Atkinson J said:
26 The JCT Standard Form of Building Contract (1980 Edition) cl 26.1
27 Connoly J.P. Construction Law Greens Concise Scots LawW. Green & Son Ltd. 1999 p. 169
28 Bell. Principles of the Law of Scoland (10th ed.), s.31
“Direct damage is that which flows naturally from the breach without
other intervening cause and independently of special circumstances, while indirect
damage does not so flow.”29 .
As an answer to the question where whether the respondents were
exempted from liability for all, or any, of the claimed heads of expense, under a
clause intended to exclude indirect and consequential loss30, Atkison J said:
“In my view, expenses are recoverable ?if they are fair and proper under
the circumstances.?31? I dare say there must be some element of necessity to make it
fair to incur the expenditure. I imagine that reasonable business necessity is as good
a guide as any other. When once it is established that an expense is recoverable as
part of the damages directly and naturally flowing from the breach because it was
reasonable and proper in the circumstances, then I answer that this clause does not
exclude it, and a fortiori if it was a necessary expense. The more necessary it is the
easier it is for the claimants to establish that it is a direct and natural result of the
breach.”32
The term “direct loss and/or damage” was further elaborated in Wraight
Ltd v P.H. & T. (Holdings) Ltd33, where the Wraight Limited were building
contractors engaged by P.H. & T. (Holdings) Limited  to carry out certain building
works. The contract was made on 25 September 1964 and was in the RIBA Standard
Form of Building Contract (1963 Edition). The claimants firstly contended before the
arbitrator that under sub-Clause (vi) of Clause 26(2)(b) they had the right to recover
the damage directly flowing from the determination of the contract. Their second
29 Saint Line Limited v Richardsons, Westgarth & Co., Limited [1940] 2 KB 99. p 4
30 Ibid. p 3
31 quoting from Mayne on Damages, 10th ed., p. 17.
32 Saint Line Limited v Richardsons, Westgarth & Co., Limited [1940] 2 KB 99. p 5
33 13 Build LR 26
contention was that damage which, if the determination were a breach of contract
would be recoverable as damages flowing naturally in the usual course of things
from the breach, is direct damage34.
The arbitrator, as appears inferentially from his award, accepted the
claimants' contentions. The court held that Wraight were entitled to recover that
which they would have obtained if the contract had been fulfilled in the terms of the
picture visualised in advance but which they had not obtained, and could not obtain,
under the contract, because of the determination35. This consideration of Megaw. J
that loss or damage caused by the determination of the contract was direct if it would
be recoverable as damages flowing naturally in the usual course of things from a
determination in breach of contract was later referred in F.G. Minter Ltd v Welsh
Health Technical Services Organization36.
3.4.2  Consequential Loss
Building and other contracts sometimes have clauses excluding
liability for “consequential” loss. The construction of each such clause will depend
on it’s own word and context, but generally consequential loss is likely to
approximate to loss within the second limb of Hadley v Baxendale. It is loss which is
in some way less direct or more remote than that loss or damages which remains
34 Ibid. p 5
35 13 Build LR 26
36 13 Build LR 1. p 9
recoverable despite the exclusion clause. “Consequential “does not cover loss which
directly and naturally results in the ordinary course of events. 37
In Millar's Machinery Co Ltd v David Way and Son38 the exclusion of
liability was of “consequential damages”. The contract involved the supply of a
defective machine by the plaintiff to the defendant: the defendant was held entitled to
reject the machine and to recover certain but not all of the damages counterclaimed.
It recovered the difference between the price of the machine sold and the higher price
of a replacement (£426), but not the wasted cost of erecting the plaintiff's machine,
apparently on the basis that it had already been compensated for the cost of erection
of the replacement machine in the £426 awarded. A further claim for the cost of
gravel which the defendant had to purchase to fulfil a contract was not allowed, on
the basis that that other contract was not within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of the machine contract and the damages were therefore too remote. The Court
of Appeal sustained the judgment of Mr Justice Branson to the above effect.
The findings of Millar's Machinery Co Ltd v David Way and Son was later
followed by Megaw J39, giving the reasons that the findings is binding he said:  “I
think that the meaning given to the word in Millars' case is applicable to the present
case. In is binding on us in this case. Even if strictly it were not binding, we ought to
follow it. That case was decided in the year 1934. It has stood, therefore, now for
more than 43 years. So far as I know it has never been adversely commented upon. It
would, of course, not be binding upon us if the terms of the clause which were there
being construed were materially different from the clause with which we are
37 Keating, D. Building Contracts 4th Edition.London Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, p. 189
38 [1935] 40 Com Cas 204
39 Croudace Construction Ltd v Cawoods Concrete Products Ltd, [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep 55
concerned. I cannot see any material difference, though of course there are verbal
differences.40
  In Saint Line Ltd v Richardsons Westgarth & Co Ltd41, Atkinson J
said:
“In my judgment, the words "indirect or consequential" do not exclude
liability for damages which are the direct and natural result of the breaches
complained of. Mr. Miller, in stressing the word ?consequential?, sought to take
advantage of the contrast with the word ?immediate? in the definition in the Oxford
Dictionary ???not direct or immediate? - and he argued that ?immediate? meant
instantaneous, the first result in point of time, and that the only immediate damage
here was the excess price which would have to be paid for the new engines. In
Webster's Dictionary, the meaning of ?immediate? is, ?not separated by anything
intervening,? and it gives as a synonym the word "direct." It merely means ?flowing
directly from without intervening cause.? I do not think ?immediate? adds anything
to the word ?direct? and I do not think ?consequential? adds anything to the word
?indirect.? What the clause does do is to protect the respondents from claims for
special damages which would be recoverable only on proof of special circumstances
and for damages contributed to by some supervening cause. I am satisfied that it
does not protect them from the claims which are made in this case.”42
In British Sugar plc v NEI Power Projects Ltd43, the contract was for the
supply of electrical equipment to a factory. There was a limitation of “consequential
loss” to the value of the contract. The defective equipment supplied caused
40 Ibid. p 12
41 [1940] 2 KB 99 p 6
42 [1940] 2 KB 99 p 5
43 [1997] 87 BLR 42
breakdowns which led to increased production costs and loss of profits. The Court of
Appeal, upholding the judgment at first instance, held that the limitation did not
apply to the damages claimed.
Regarding to the limitation clause, Waller J said:
“On a proper reading of that clause, an obligation was being placed on the
defendants to pay such damages as flowed naturally and directly from any supply by
the defendants of faulty goods or materials, with the limitation being imposed in
relation to some other type of loss which did not flow so directly.”44
3.5   Heads of Claims
Apart from additional project specific costs a contractor's loss and
expense claim for delay and disruption is commonly brought under the following
heads45:
? loss of profit;
? finance charges;
? overheads;
? loss of productivity or uneconomic working
44 Ibid.
45 Mallesons Stephen Jaques. What does “loss and expense” mean? Asian Projects and Construction
Update -8 March 2003
3.5.1  Loss of Profit
Base on the particular facts of each case, loss of profit may be
recovered under a “loss and expense” clause, usually categorized as either direct
damages or indirect/consequential damages.
  Contractor’s commonly claim a loss of profit arising out of the
diminution in turnover, but it seems that to established this claim he must show, as
with overheads, that at the time of delay he could have used the lost turnover
profitably.46 A claim for loss of profit does not, it is submitted, fail merely because
the contract in question was unprofitable. The question is what the contractor would
have done with he money if he had received it at a proper time. Even if, at the time,
the contractor’s business was making a loss a sum analogous to a loss of profit is, it
is submitted, recoverable if the loss of turnover increased the loss of business.47
  The relationship of damages to profit requires an analysis and
comparison of the contractor’s hypothetical costs, had there been no breach, with his
costs as increased by the breach. In cases of delay, it will involve, quite separately
from it’s effect upon costs, analysis and comparison of the contractor’s profit had
there been no delay, with his profit as decreased, if it be he case, by the delay. (It
follows, of course, that if costs do not increase or profit do not decrease, only
nominal damages can be recovered, certainly in the Commonwealth common law
countries). This is quite different proposition from claiming profit pon additional cost
url:
http://www.mallesons.com/publications/Asian_Projects_and_Construction_Update/6366696W.htm
46 refer B Sunley & Co, Ltd v Cunard White Star, Ltd [1940] 66 Ll.L.Rep. 134
47 Keating, D. Building Contracts 4th Edition.London Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, p. 211
or expenses caused by a breach, which many contractot seek to do. That offend
agaist the fundamental compensatory damages principle.48
The issue of loss of profit is brought up and well discussed in Wraight Ltd
v P.H. & T. (Holdings) Ltd49, where Wraight Limited were building contractors
engaged by P.H. & T. (Holdings) Limited to carry out certain building works. The
contract was made on 25 September 1964 and was in the RIBA Standard Form of
Building Contract (1963 Edition). The contract works were commenced in
November 1974 but, shortly thereafter, because unexpectedly difficult soil conditions
were encountered the architect instructed that the works should be suspended. That
instruction was issued under Clause 21(2) of the building contract and, on 1 February
1965, the suspension having continued for more than the period mentioned in the
Appendix to the contract conditions, Wraight duly determined their employment and
became entitled to be paid by P.H. & T. the amounts set forth in Clause 26(2)(b). The
parties were unable to agree what sum ought to be paid to Wraight under that Clause
and the matter was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator was requested to make his
award in the form of a special case for the opinion of the High Court and one of the
question arose was:
“Upon the true construction of Clause 26(2)(b)(vi) of the contract, is the
loss of open profit and discount claimed direct loss and/or damage caused to the
Contractor by the determination?”50
While putting up argument such loss of profit is direct loss and/or damage,
it was said that the contractor necessarily and properly includes not merely the cost
of wages and materials but also a proportion of the overhead costs of his business
48 Ibid. p. 110
49 13 Build LR 26
5013 Build LR 26 p 2
which cannot be directly related to any particular part of the business of the
Claimants but which can properly be broken down in order, in part, to be attributed
to any given contract which they are seeking to obtain. If that were not done, they
would always be working at a loss because they would have made no provision for
their profit and they would have made no provision for the overheads which are
inevitable for the running of a business51. The Respondent on the other way round
contended that that loss of gross profit, which is necessarily dependent upon
uncertain events (such as whether profit would have been earned in fact, and the
possible alternative uses of the Claimants' facilities and the profits therefrom) is not
"direct loss and/or damage" but indirect and consequential52. The Arbitrator, as
appears inferentially from his award, accepted the Claimants' contentions.
While giving his judgement, Megaw. J said:
“In my judgment, there are no grounds for giving to the words ?direct loss
and/or damage caused to the Contractor by the determination? any other meaning
than that which they have, for example, in a case of breach of contract or other
question of the relationship of a fault to damage in a legal context. Therefore it
follows -- subject to any question about the meaning of the words ?loss of gross
profit? in the question which has been propounded by the Arbitrator - that the
Claimants are, as a matter of law, entitled to recover that which they would have
obtained if this contract had been fulfilled in terms of the picture visualised in
advance but which they have not obtained, and cannot now obtain, under the
contract, because the contract has been determined.
?In my judgment, the Arbitrator arrived at the right answer in answering
that question in the affirmative”53.
51 Ibid. p 4
52 Ibid. p 5
53 13 Build LR 26 p 7
However, claim for loss of profit is greatly depending on words used in the
exclusion clause. In Deepak Fertilisers and Petrochemical Corporation v ICI
Chemicals & Polymers Ltd54, regarding an exclusion clause excluding of “loss of
anticipated profits . . . or for indirect or consequential damages”, Stuart-Smith J
giving the judgment of the Court, said:
“The direct and natural result of the destruction of the plant was that
Deepak was left without a methanol plant, the reconstruction of which would cost
money and take time, losing for Deepak any methanol production in the meantime.
Wasted overheads incurred during the reconstruction of the plant, as well as profits
lost during that period, are no more remote as losses than the cost of reconstruction.
Lost profits cannot be recovered because they are excluded in terms, not because
they are too remote. We consider that this Court is bound by the decision in
Croudace where a similar loss was not excluded by a similar exclusion and
considered to be direct loss.”55
In Semco Salvage and Marine Pte Ltd v Lancer Navigation Co Ltd; The
Nagasaki Spirit56, regarding to International Convention on Salvage 1989, it was
held that:
“?as incorporated into Lloyd's Open Form 1990 for salvage,
?expenses . . . incurred? by a salvor denoted amounts either disbursed or borne, not
earned as profits. Accordingly, an award of special compensation under art 14.2 was
intended to recompense or reimburse a salvor for his expenses in the event that his
direct and standby costs exceeded his salvage reward under art 13 and was not
intended to yield or be a source of profit.”57 Thus, under this clause, the contractor
could only recover outgoing money and not remuneration or profit.
54 [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep 387.
55 [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep 387.
56 [1997] 1 All ER 502, [1997] 2 WLR 298, [1997] 1 Lloyds Rep 323, 141 SJ LB 43
57 Ibid p 2.
In a recent Scottish case Robertson Group (Construction) Ltd v Amey-
Miller (Edinburgh) Joint Venture and Ors58, where in October 2001 the pursuers and
the first defenders entered into a contract of an essentially temporary nature in terms
of which the pursuers were to start the refurbishment work at the High School. The
terms of that contract are contained in a letter from the first defenders to the pursuers
dated 12 October 2001; those terms were accepted by the pursuers by their starting
work on the project in accordance with the first defenders' instructions.
While defending their case, the defenders contended that the use of that
expression restricted sums due to the pursuers to costs directly attributable to the
High School contract. These would include the cost of labour, plant and materials
used on the particular contract. On the other hand they would exclude costs
attributable to the pursuers' enterprise considered as a whole; that would exclude
head office overheads. The expression would also exclude any element of profit on
the contract. If the pursuers were to make a profit in respect of works carried out at
the High School, which could only occur under the formal contract that was
contemplated by the parties59. The pursuers, by contrast, contended that the
expression "all direct costs and directly incurred losses" permitted them to recover
not only the cost of labour and materials expended on the High School contract
together with the cost of plant and sums paid to subcontractors but also an
appropriate sum to cover their head office overheads and an appropriate element of
profit60.
While delivering his judgment, Drummond Young J say:
58 [2005] CSOH 60CA80/03
59 [2005] CSOH 60CA80/03 p 2
60 Ibid. p 3
“ I consider that the losses that can be claimed by the pursuers are those
arising from the works instructed by the defenders in accordance with the letter of 12
October 2001. They do not include losses on the formal contract. Indeed, that would
not be possible because the letter of 12 October 2001 operates on the hypothesis that
no formal contract has been concluded; consequently no losses could arise under the
formal contract.”61
3.5.2  Finance Charges
The House of Lords has held that interest may be recoverable where
special damages could be established (i.e. cases where the party in breach had notice
of the special loss likely to be incurred and it could be said to have contracted with
that loss in contemplation)62. The House of Lord’s decision in London, Chatham and
Dover Railway Co. v. South Eastern Railway Co.63, that at common law, in the
absence of any agreement or statutory provisions for the payment of interest, a court
had no power to award interest, simple or compound, by way of damages for the
detention (i.e., the late payment) of a debt, was discussed in President of India v La
Pintada Compania64.
61 Ibid. p 6
62 Mallesons Stephen Jaques. What does “loss and expense” mean? Asian Projects and Construction
Update -8 March 2003
url:
http://www.mallesons.com/publications/Asian_Projects_and_Construction_Update/6366696W.htm
63 [1893] A.C. 429
64 [1985] AC 104
In the case, Roskill J said:
“It has long been recognised that London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co.
v. South Eastern Railway Co. [1893] A.C. 429 left creditors with a legitimate sense
of grievance and an obvious injustice without remedy. I think the House in 1893
recognised those consequences of the decision, but then felt compelled for historical
reasons to leave that injustice uncorrected.”65
Later, on the same case, Brightman L.J. found that, by reason of special
matters known to both parties at the time of contracting, the two items of special
damages claimed by the plaintiff came within the second part of that rule.
Accordingly, treating the London, Chatham and Dover Railway case as applying
only to damages falling within the first part of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale
(general damages), he saw no reason why the plaintiff should not recover the two
disputed items of special damages under the second part of that rule.66
The distinction between a claim for general damages, where interest cannot
be awarded as damages, and a claim for special damages, where interest can be so
awarded as damages, and a claim for special damages,  where interest can be so
awarded, in the same as the distinction between the first and second limbs of the rule
in Hadley v. Baxendale.
“The surviving principle of legal policy is that it is a legal presumption
that in the ordinary course of things a person does not suffer any loss b reason of the
late payment of money. This is an artificial presumption, but is justified by the fact
that the usual loss is an interest loss and that compensation for this has been
provided for and limited by statute.”67
65 Ibid. p 7
66 [1985] AC 104 p 21
67 Per Honhouse J. in International Minerals v Larl O. Helm [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 81 at 104
On the face of it, this might seem to mean that, where a plaintiff incurs
bank interest charges on an overdraft, “?the more the defaulting party can show that
this was not because of some unusual or ?special? circumstances of the particular
contract but because of the well known way in which the relevant trade or business is
normally carried on, the less likely it be that plaintiff can cover his loss.”68 This
possibly anomaly could readily occur in building contracts since the loss of the
interest which the [contractor] has to pay on the capital he is forced to borrow and on
the capital which he is not free to invest would recoverable for the employer’s breach
of contract within the first rule in Hadley v. Baxendale without resorting to the
second.” 69
A claim for interest as special damages must be pleaded and proved either
as interest paid to bank or as interest which would otherwise have been earned from
investment.70
However, later case such as Ogilvie Builders Ltd v City of Glasgow
District Council71, it was held that there is no general rule that financing charges, if
recoverable at all, can only be recoverable under the second branch of the rule in
Hadley v Baxendale. Abernethy J said:
“It follows from the conclusion I have come to that I do not accept the
submission made by counsel for the defenders that the approach of Scots law is to
treat financing charges as an item which, if they are to be recoverable at all, must
come under the second branch of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale. There may have
been a tendency in the past to treat claims for such items as claims for impecuniosity
68 Per Nicholas L.J. in President if India v Lips maritime [1988] A.C. 395 at 413 (C.A.)
69 Keating, D. Building Contracts 4th Edition.London Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, p. 214
70 Keating, D. Building Contracts 4th Edition.London Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, p. 215
71 (1994) 41 Con LR 1
and I think practitioners may have, when possible, preferred to plead a claim for
such items in terms of the second branch of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale. That is
understandable. But that is not to say that such claims must be pled under that
branch, or fail?
I am of opinion that the pursuer's averments based on the first branch of
the rule in Hadley v Baxendale are not irrelevant. Even if I am wrong in my view that
the word 'directly' is to be equiparated with 'naturally' in the sense used in the first
branch of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale, I am of the opinion that the pursuers'
claim for financing charges could still come within the phrase 'direct loss and/or
expense'. I say that because in my opinion these charges on the averments resulted
from the matters which affected the regular progress of the works directly in the
sense that they followed one from the other without any intervening cause.”72
In F.G. Minter Ltd v Welsh Health Technical Services Organization73
"direct loss and/or expense" included interest which the contractor paid on capital
borrowed as a result of events specified in those clauses, and interest which the
contractor was prevented from earning as a result of those events. While allowing
interest loss between the loss and/or expense being incurred and the making of a
written application for reimbursement of the same, Stephenson LJ said:
“I cannot see why interest lost or expended before the application, a loss
or expense necessarily not more than three weeks old, is not direct loss or
expense.”74
Where interest is payable under an express term of the contract, simple or
compound interest will be awarded according to the express words as construed.75
Discretionary interest pursuant to statute is a simple interest only. It may be awards
72 (1994) 41 Con LR 1 p 14
73 [1980]13 Build LR 1
74 Ibid. p 12
as damages as discussed above can only be for simple interest, although it is
susgested that the question ought to turn on the extent of the defenant’s knowledge at
the time contract was made.76
The Court of Appeal has expressly approved the use of compound interest
calculations in the determination of the financing charges element of a direct loss and
expense claim in Rees & Kirby Ltd v Swansea City Council77. Answering the the
question whether the respondents are entitled to recover their financing charges only
on the basis of simple interest, or whether they are entitled to assess their claim on
the basis of compound interest, calculated at quarterly rests,
Robert Goff L J say:
“We must bear in mind, moreover, that what we are here considering is a
debt due under a contract; this is not a claim to interest as such, as for example a
claim to interest under the Law Reform Act, but a claim in respect of loss or expense
in which a contractor has been involved by reason of certain specific events. The
respondents, like (I imagine) most building contractors, operated over the relevant
period on the basis of a substantial overdraft at their bank, and their claim in respect
of financing charges consists of a claim in respect of interest paid by them to the
bank on the relevant amount during that period. It is notorious that banks do
themselves, when calculating interest on overdrafts, operate on the basis of periodic
rests; on the basis of the principle stated by the Court of Appeal in Minter's case,
which we here have to apply, I for my part can see no reason why that fact should
not be taken into account when calculating the respondents' claim for loss or expense
in the present case.”78
75 Keating, D. Building Contracts 4th Edition.London Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, p. 215
76 Ibid. p. 216
77 [1985]30 Build LR 1, 5 ConLR 34, 1 Const 378
78 [1985]30 Build LR 1, 5 ConLR 34, 1 Const 378  p 15
Thus, if a contract is silent on the interest entitlements of a contractor on
overdue, finance charges can be a valid head claim for loss and expense, based on
particular case circumstances and facts.
3.5.3  Overheads
  On any contract, delay or disruption will lead inevitably to some
increase in direct head-office administrative costs, relating not only to any period of
delay but also to the involvement of staff in dealing with the problems caused by
disruption, e.g. contract managers spending more time in organising additional
labour, recasting programmes, etc., buying staff in, ordering additional material,
arranging plant hire and the like. As has been said, efficient contractors will require
their staff to keep time records and where this is done the cost involved should be
readily ascertainable. 79
  Overheads, is a loose term referring to the costs of running he
contractor’s general business as distinct from the site costs of the particular contract.
If particular head office costs are proved to have been increased b a contract’s delay,
they are recoverable. Example would be the cost of extra recruited because the
particular contract was in difficulties or the cost of extra telephone calles and postage
in the periodof delay. But substantial claims of this kind are rarely made because
most contractors are able to cope with delay on a particular contract with their
79 Powell-Smith, V. and Sims, J. Building Contract Claims. Granada Publishing, 1983, p. 106
existing resources whose cost is reasonably constant. Accordingly claims for loss of
overheads are usually made on different basis.80
A contractor’s overheads are commonly taken to be recovered out of the
income from his business as a whole and ordinarily where completion of one contract
is delayed the contractor claims to have suffered a loss arising from the diminution of
his income from the job and hence the turnover of his business. But he continues to
incur expenditure on overheads which he cannot materially reduce or in respect of
the site, can only reduce, if at all, to a limited extent.81
But for the delay, the workforce would have the opportunity of being
employed on another contract which would have had the effect of contributing to the
overheads during the overrun period. This is well discussed in Finnegan v Sheffield
City Council, 82 where one of the issue arose was “whether the allowance for
overheads and profit was to be calculated using the “Hudson formula”, that is
overhead and profit percentage based on a fair annual average, multiplied by the
contract sum and the period of delay in weeks divided by the contract period.”
While giving his judgment, Sir William Stabb QC said:
“As to Issue No 4, the answer would be relatively easy to give on the basis of
the authorities to which I was referred and of the reference to such a claim in
Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts, were it not for one feature of this
case which was seemingly absent in the previous cases. I refer to the fact that in this
contract the plaintiffs deployed about one third of their own labour, whereas the
remaining two thirds was subcontracted labour. It is generally accepted that, on
principle, a contractor who is delayed in completing a contract due to the default of
80 Keating, D. Building Contracts 4th Edition.London Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, p. 210
81 Ibid p. 211
82 (1988) 43 B.L.R. 124 at 134
his employer, may properly have a claim for head office or off-site overheads during
the period of delay, on the basis that the work-force, but for the delay, might have
had the opportunity of being employed on another contract which would have had
the effect of funding the overheads during the overrun period.83
?However, I confess that I consider the plaintiffs' method of calculation of
the overheads on the basis of a notional contract valued by uplifting the value of the
direct cost by the constant of 3.51 as being too speculative and I infinitely prefer the
Hudson formula which, in my judgment, is the right one to apply in this case, that is
to say, overhead and profit percentage based upon a fair annual average, multiplied
by the contract sum and the period of delay in weeks, divided by the contract
period.?84
It is suggested that, in order to succeed, a contractor has in principle to
prove hat there were other work available which, but for the delay, he would have
secured but which in fact because of the delay he did not secure. He might do his by
producing invitations of tender which he declined with evidence that the reason for
declining was that the delay in question left him insufficient capacity to undertake
other work. He might alternatively show from his accounts a drop in turnover and
established that this resulted from the particular delay rather than from extraneous
causes. If loss of turnover resulting from delay is not established, the effect of the
delay is only the receipt of the money is delayed. It is not loss.85
83 (1988) 43 B.L.R. 124 p. 8
84 Ibid. p.10
85 Keating, D. Building Contracts 4th Edition.London Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, p. 211
3.5.4  Loss of Productivity
Loss of productivity is a head of claim sometimes made where there has
been delay in completion or disturbance of the contractor’s regular and economic
progress even though, on occasions, the ultimate delay in completion is small or does
not occur. As regards machinery and plant it is ordinarily comparatively easy to
compare the contemplated damages. Labour is more difficult. Some contractors add
an arbitrary percentage to the contemplated labour costs. It is difficult to see how this
can be sustained.86
The computation of loss of productivity claims is one of the more difficult
problems in this field. An arbitrary guess or assertation of some percentage of the
total affected labour or plant costs of the trades in question is not convincing.87
In Tate & Lyle Food and Distribution Ltd v Greater London Council and
another88 , regarding to a similar claim, the court held that the expenditure of
managerial time in remedying an actionable wrong done to a trading concern could
properly form the subject matter of special damage which could be claimed by the
concern. However, by failing to record the managerial time spent on remedying the
siltation, the plaintiffs had failed to prove the special damage under that head, and in
the absence of proof the court would not speculate on quantum by awarding as the
damages under that head a percentage of the plaintiffs' total damages. Accordingly,
the claim for damages for the expenditure of managerial time in remedying the
siltation failed.89
86 Ibid.
87 Duncan Wallace, I.N. Contruction Contracts:Principles and Policies in Tort and Contract. London
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986 p. 114
88 [1982] 1 W.L.R. 149
89 Ibid.
There can be no or general rule to ascertain the loss because the loss will
vary in each case. A better starting point is to compare actual labour costs with those
contemplated.90 Thus a particular activity or part of the works is taken and, where the
contract price can be ascertained, as by reference to the priced bills, the labour
element is extracted.91
This is a matter of experienced surveyors and is done by taking the unit
price and applying constants which are generally accepted in the trade. From the
contractor’s records the actual labour content for the activity or part is extracted.
From the difference must be deducted any expenditure upon labour which was not
caused by the breach, for example delay or disturbance caused by bad weather,
strikes, nominated subcontractors or the contractor’s own inefficiency. If the original
contract price was arrived at in a properly organized competition or as the result of
negotiations with a skilled surveyor acting on behalf of the employer, the adjusted
figure for the difference is some evidence of loss of productivity.92
3.5.5  Overlap of Claims
The possibility should be borne in mind of an overlap between he
percentage claimed for the delay period and the same percentage being separately
claimed, directly or indirectly, on the value for additional expenditure contributing to
90 Whittal Builders CO Ltd v Chester-Le-Street District Coucil 40 Build LR 82
91 Keating, D. Building Contracts 4th Edition.London Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, p. 212
92 Keating, D. Building Contracts 4th Edition.London Sweet & Maxwell, 1978,
the same delay due to the breach of contract during the construction period.93 Thus in
Shore and Horwitz v Franki Canada94the Court of Appeal of Ontario had confirmed
a Master’s Award of $3,692, being 4.99 percent. for overheads on additional
construction costs caused by a piling sub-contractor delays, but disallowed $13,309,
being four and three quarter months of overheads for he delay period. The Supreme
Court of Canada correctly restored the larger delay period overheads, but would
appear to have overlooked the almost certain duplication suggested by the report
with the smaller figure.
In one of the leading U.S. cases, J. D. Hedin Construction v U.S.  the Court of
Claims themselves made a deduction for this overlap with the profit and overhead
element in previous change-order payments without thinking it necessary to explain
further. It is submitted that this must be right in principle.95
Whether the overlap exists or not will depend entirely upon how the
contractor has computed his various other claims for disturbance and additional
expenditure during the construction period, and it is most likely to arise where
variations or changes have led to a claim based on price, or where for some reason
93 Duncan Wallace, I.N. Contruction Contracts:Principles and Policies in Tort and Contract. London
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986  p. 131
94 (1964) S.C.R. 589
95 Duncan Wallace, I.N. Contruction Contracts:Principles and Policies in Tort and Contract. London
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986 p. 131
the contractor has use a calculation involving a price-based element for computing
his damages in regard to a particular clam.96
96 Duncan Wallace, I.N. Contruction Contracts:Principles and Policies in Tort and Contract. London
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986 p. 131
CHAPTER 4
DIRECT LOSS AND EXPENSES RELATING TO
REMOTENESS OF DAMAGES
4.1  Introduction
Contractor’s claim for direct loss and expenses against an employer may
depend on the damages claim are too remote or not too remote, are usually link to
remoteness of damages, namely the rule of Hadley v Baxendale and section 74 under
Contract Act 1950. Therefore, several head of claims such as loss of profit, finance
charges, overheads etc are discussed relating to the first and second branch of Hadley
v Baxendale. Recent development and its effect to such head of claims are also
analyzed. The analysis will establish an overall view of the relation between head of
claims and remoteness of damages.
  For those head of claims that lack of critical issues relating to
remoteness of damages, the particular issues arise will be analyzed.
4.2  Head of Claims and Remoteness of Damages
The head of claims that will be analyzed include loss of profit, finance
charges, overheads, loss of productivity and global claim.
4.2.1 Loss of Profit
Loss of profit is a valid head of claim under both first limb and second
limb rule in Hadley v Baxendale.
4.2.1.1 Profit Claim under First Limb
Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd V Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor.1 Rumah
Nanas Estate Sdn Bhd, the vendor agreed to sell to the plaintiffs, Plenitude Holdings
1 [1994] 2 MLJ 273
Sdn Bhd a piece of estate land. The land was purchased for the purpose of
development and the vendor was aware of this fact. The first defendant promised to
obtain a loan for the plaintiffs and gave an undertaking that in the event that he was
unable to do so, the defendants would join the plaintiffs in a joint venture to develop
the land. The purchasers paid a deposit, but failed to pay the balance sum within the
stipulated period. The vendor then terminated the agreement and forfeited the deposit.
The trial judge came to the conclusion that the termination of the agreement by the
vendor was not valid and ordered specific performance of the agreement for the sale
and purchase of the land, with damages to be assessed for wrongful termination and
breach of undertaking.The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court which
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the High Court. In this application
for assessment of damages which was made pursuant to the High Court order, the
damages which fell to be assessed were, inter alia, for wrongful termination of the
agreement, loss of profits on the development project and interest on the deposit paid
by the purchaser to the vendor.
The court held that the defendants were fully aware that the plaintiffs had
purchased the land for the purpose of development and that by not honouring their
undertakings, the plaintiffs would be unable to proceed with the development
and thereby suffer loss of profit on the proposed housing project. The loss
suffered by the plaintiffs was a natural and probable result of the defendant'
s breach of the contract and any loss of profit normally to be expected which
the developer would have earned but for the breach, is an allowable claim
under the rule in Hadley v Baxendale.
Wraight Ltd v P.H. & T. (Holdings) Ltd2. Wraight Limited were building
contractors engaged by P.H. & T. (Holdings) Limited to carry out certain building
2 13 Build LR 26
works. The contract was made on 25 September 1964 and was in the RIBA Standard
Form of Building Contract (1963 Edition). The contract works were commenced in
November 1974 but, shortly thereafter, because unexpectedly difficult soil conditions
were encountered the architect instructed that the works should be suspended. That
instruction was issued under Clause 21(2) of the building contract and, on 1 February
1965, the suspension having continued for more than the period mentioned in the
Appendix to the contract conditions, Wraight duly determined their employment and
became entitled to be paid by P.H. & T. the amounts set forth in Clause 26(2)(b). The
parties were unable to agree what sum ought to be paid to Wraight under that Clause
and the matter was referred to arbitration, later to court.
Wraight were entitled to recover that which they would have obtained if
the contract had been fulfilled in the terms of the picture visualised in advance but
which they had not obtained, and could not obtain, under the contract, because of the
determination, which includes loss of open profit and discount claimed direct loss
and/or damage caused to the Contractor by the determination. Such loss of open
profit is considered arising naturally tf that were not done, contractor would always
be working at a loss because they would have made no provision for their profit and
they would have made no provision for the overheads which are inevitable for the
running of a business
In Plenitude, wrongful termination of the agreement by the vendor had
cause the loss of profit. In Wraight, architect instruction to suspend work which later
lead to determination by contractor had also incurred loss of profit. Thus, this two
cases show that whenever the loss of profit considered arising naturally in that
particular business falls within first limb of Hadley v Baxendale.
4.2.1.2 Profit Claim under Second Limb
Kpohraror v Woolwich Building Society3. The plaintiff, a Nigerian,
converted an existing savings account with the defendant building society to a
current account. On the application form he described himself as a self-employed
“exporter/importer”. The plaintiff subsequently drew a cheque on his account in
favour of P Ltd. When P Ltd presented the cheque for payment with a request for
special clearance, the defendants refused payment on the ground that the cheque had
been reported lost. Later that same day, the defendants acknowledged that an error
had occurred and immediately informed P Ltd that there were sufficient funds in the
plaintiff's account to honour the cheque. The following day, P Ltd accepted one of
the defendants' own corporate cheques as payment and thereupon released goods
which were required by the plaintiff for shipment to Nigeria. The plaintiff
subsequently commenced proceedings against the defendants claiming damages for
wrongful dishonour of the cheque in breach of his current account contract with the
defendants. They admitted liability and the master awarded damages with interest as
general damages for the injury to the plaintiff's credit by reason of the dishonour of
the cheque and the discreditable reason given by them for so doing. The award
included a small allowance for the alleged injury to the plaintiff's credit and
reputation in Nigeria. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal, contending that
he was also entitled to recover special damages for trading losses sustained by reason
of the delay to the shipment in question and further shipments. The defendants cross-
appealed, contending that the damages awarded should be nominal on the ground
that they did not know that the account was to be used for trading purposes.
3 [1996] 4 All ER 119
A person who was not a trader could recover substantial rather than
nominal damages in contract for loss of credit or business reputation resulting from a
cheque being wrongly dishonoured by his bank. It followed that the master's award
was consistent with the correct approach to an award of general damages in the
circumstances. However, the special damages which the plaintiff sought to recover
were too remote, since there was nothing to indicate that a one-day delay in payment
would cause the loss of a transaction or a substantial trading loss for the plaintiff, and
the defendants could reasonably have expected that they would have been given
special notice of the need for immediate clearance so that, if they were willing to do
so, a special arrangement could be made. The appeal and cross-appeal would
accordingly be dismissed.
Seven Seas Properties Ltd v Al-Essa and another4. The defendants owned
two leasehold properties which were offered for sale at £15m. The plaintiffs were
interested in purchasing the properties for the purpose of a quick resale at a profit and
found a sub-purchaser willing to purchase for £1,635,000 but kept to themselves
their intention to sell on and it was only after the contracts for sale between the
plaintiffs and the defendants and between the plaintiffs and the sub-purchaser had
been signed that the defendants learnt of the resale contract. The defendants believed
they had been underpaid by the difference in the amounts payable under the two
contracts and refused to complete, with the result that the plaintiffs were unable to
complete the resale contract. The sub-purchaser considered that it was discharged
from further performance of its contract by the plaintiffs' breach in failing to
complete and brought an action claiming damages from the plaintiffs, who in turn
brought an action against the defendants for specific performance. An order was
made in the plaintiffs' action for specific performance and an inquiry as to damages
was directed. The sale by the defendants to the plaintiffs was then completed and on
4 [1993] 1 WLR 1083
the same day the plaintiffs sold the property to the sub-purchaser for £1,375,000. On
the inquiry as to damages the plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, both their loss of profit of
£135,000 (less certain deductions) under the original contract for resale and the loss
of £125,000 made under the contract for resale as finally concluded.
A plaintiff was entitled to recover all damages for a breach of contract
which at the date of the contract the defaulting party was on notice might be
occasioned by the breach and which was a liability for which he could fairly be held,
in entering into the contract, to have accepted the risk. However, the defaulting party
would only be held to have accepted the risk if he was on notice of the purpose and
intent of the plaintiff in entering into the contract with him and the consequent
exposure of the plaintiff to the risk of damage of the character in question in the
event of the defaulting party's breach. A plaintiff claiming to recover from the
defaulting party losses arising under a sub-contract had to establish that the
defendant was on notice of the existence, at the date of the contract, of the plaintiff's
purpose and intent to enter into a further contract which was dependent for its
fulfilment on the due performance by the defendant of the first contract. It was not
sufficient for the plaintiff to establish that the conclusion of a sub-contract was an
available option. In order for the defendants to be liable to the plaintiffs for the loss
incurred by the plaintiffs it was necessary for the defendants to have been aware of
the plaintiffs' contract to sell the property at a profit.
In Kpohraror, it is a sole proprietor’s case claiming for loss of profit,
somehow was dismissed due to fact that the defendant had no particular knowledge
on what the plaintiff wanted to do. Although contractor’s nature of work can be
identified quite clearly, however, if a contractor has an special profit which exist in
special circumstances, it should be made known if he eventually wish to claim such
loss of profit in the future. In Seven Seas Properties, it was held that loss of profit
under a resale contract to third party was not claimable, because there was no
contemplation at the beginning about such arrangement. For loss of profit which
considered not arising naturally in such nature of that particular business, it is not
within first limb of Hadley v Baxendale. For it to be included in the second limb of
Hadley v Baxendale, it must contemplated and preferably with special arrangement.
Jackson v. Royal Bank of Scotland.5 Mr. Jackson and Mr. Davies carried
on business in partnership under the name Samson, which imported goods from the
Far East and sold them to customers in the United Kingdom. Samsons principal
customer was another partnership, Economy Bag, which sold dog chews to its
wholesale and retail customers. The Bank acted as bankers to both parterships. The
transaction proceeded normally until Mar. 15, 1993, when the Bank in error sent a
completion statement and other documents including Pet Products invoice to
Economy Bag instead of to Samson. The effect of the Banks error was to reveal to
Economy Bag the substantial profit that Samson was making on these transactions.
On this occasion it amounted to a mark-up of 19 per cent. on the amount payable to
Pet Products by Samson, excluding the 5 per cent. handling charge. This was as
much, if not more than, the amount of the profit that Economy Bag was making on
its transactions with its own distributors. On discovering the mark-up, Economy Bag
terminated the relationship. Four existing contracts were performed, but thereafter
Economy Bag bought its dog chews from Pet Products direct. The loss of its business
with Economy Bag had disastrous consequences for Samson, and the partnership was
dissolved. The claimants commenced proceedings against the Bank.
 The House of Lord held that the loss of repeat orders and future profit from
Economy Bag was not too remote. As soon as the confidential information was
5  [2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep 366
released there was no repeat business. The claimants were entitled to an award of
damages to put them in the same position as they would have been if there had been
no breach of contract.
Robertson Group (Construction) Ltd v Amey-Miller (Edinburgh) Joint
Venture and Ors.6 In October 2001 the pursuers and the first defenders entered into a
contract of an essentially temporary nature in terms of which the pursuers were to
start the refurbishment work at the High School. The terms of that contract are
contained in a letter from the first defenders to the pursuers dated 12 October 2001;
those terms were accepted by the pursuers by their starting work on the project in
accordance with the first defenders' instructions. While defending their case, the
defenders contended that the use of that expression restricted sums due to the
pursuers to costs directly attributable to the High School contract. These would
include the cost of labour, plant and materials used on the particular contract. On the
other hand they would exclude costs attributable to the pursuers' enterprise
considered as a whole; that would exclude head office overheads. The expression
would also exclude any element of profit on the contract.
The court concluded that the term “all direct costs and directly incurred
losses” (not found in any of the standard form contracts), resulted in an entitlement to
recover costs and losses arising naturally in the usual course of business and could be
extended to include a percentage for lost profit and general overheads.
The extent of this entitlement was capped by the terms of a letter of intent and not the
contract sum specified in a contract which had not yet been entered into.
6 [2005] CSOH 60 CA80/03
In Robertson, the loss of profit is extended to the terms contained in a letter
of intent that temporary in nature; while in Jackson, it was extended to loss of future
profit. Such loss of profit in both cases were held not too remote, falling under the
first limb of Hadley v Baxendale.
4.2.2 Finance Charges
Finance charges is a valid head of claim under both first limb and second
limb rule in Hadley v Baxendale.
4.2.2.1  Finance Charges under First Limb
F.G. Minter Ltd v Welsh Health Technical Services Organization7 The
Claimants were the main contractors employed to construct the University Hospital
of Wales (second phase) Teaching Hospital. The main contract was substantially in
the 1963 edition of the RIBA Standard Form of Building Contract Local Authorities
edition with quantities. The Claimants employed Drake and Scull Engineering Ltd
('Drake and Scull') as their nominated sub-contractors for the electrical and
mechanical services. The sub-contract was in the NFBTE/FASS/CASEC standard
form for use where the sub-contractor was nominated under the 1963 edition of the
RIBA form of main contract. By the express terms of the sub-contract Drake and
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Scull were similarly entitled to recover amounts of "direct and/or expense" and the
Claimants were obliged at Drake and Scull's request and cost to obtain for them any
benefits of the main contract so far as the same were applicable to the sub-contract
works. During the course of the contract a number of variations were made to the
works some of which were variations to Drake and Scull's sub-contract works.
Further, the regular progress of the works as a whole and of Drake and Scull's sub-
contract works was materially affected by lack of necessary instructions, drawings,
details or levels. The amounts paid were challenged as insufficient, the basis of the
challenge being that because they had not been certified and paid until long after the
time when the Claimants or Drake and Scull had been involved in loss or expense the
sums certified ought to have included amounts in respect of the loss and/or expense,
in which they had been involved either by way of finance changes and/or being stood
out of their money for such long periods. The Respondents contended that interest or
finance charges were not part of the amounts of direct loss and/or expense to which
the Claimants were properly entitled. The dispute was referred to arbitration later to
court.
The court held that such finance charges are direct, and Stephenson LJ said:
“I cannot see why interest lost or expended before the application, a loss or
expense necessarily not more than three weeks old, is not direct loss or expense. The
judge held (see 11 Build LR 1 at p. 12) that it was not direct within Clause 11(6)
because it was "directly due to the fact that they (the Claimants) have chosen to wait
before making application", and they were not direct within Clause 24(1) because
they are "losses resulting from the fact that the effect of the interruption was not
immediately ascertainable".I find the reasoning difficult to follow and impossible to
accept. Of the Clause 11(6) loss I think the judge is saying that it would be direct
were it not for the intervening (and avoidable?) Delay of up to 21 days which makes
it indirect. I regret that I cannot agree. It would not only be reasonable for the
Claimants to wait 21 days; the contract contemplates that they may do so. If the loss
is direct when the 21 days start to run, it is, in my opinion, still direct throughout
those 21 days. Of Clause 24(1) he seems to say that no loss can result from the
interruption of the progress of the works by a specified event unless the loss has been
incurred at the time at which it becomes apparent that the works have been affected,
so that interest charges between that time and the application result directly from the
21 days (or less) delay and not from the interruption. Again with respect I cannot
agree. If the charges are incurred because of the interruption during the short period
allowed by the contract for making the application, why are they not a direct result of
the interruption?”8
Department Of The Environment v Farrans (Construction) Ltd.9 The
defendant (the contractor) entered into a building contract with Craigavon
Development Commission for the construction of an office block. The plaintiff (the
employer) succeeded to the rights and duties of the Commission. The contract was in
the standard form of building contract issued by the Joint Contracts Tribunal under
the sanction of the Royal Institute of British Architects and various other bodies and
known as the "Local Authorities Edition with Quantities 1963 Edition (July 1972
Revision)". Various disputes arose between the parties, including a dispute as to the
employer's right to make deductions as liquidated damages and also as to the
contractor's right to interest on monies deducted but subsequently paid. An arbitrator
was appointed but the employer, on the basis that the interest claim raised difficult
questions of law, brought an originating summons to determine whether the
employer should pay interest to the contractor on the various sums deducted as
liquidated damages but later paid by the employer to the contractor and, if so, the
basis on which interest should be calculated.
8 13 Build LR 1 p. 13
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The court held that if in such a claim for breach of contract before the
arbitrator the contractor proves (a) that because of interest or financing charges it
suffered loss or damage through the employer's failure to pay any of the deducted
sums on the due date, and (b) that a reasonable person in the employer's position
would have contemplated such loss or damage as a probable consequence of the
employer's breach, the arbitrator should award damages to the contractor to
compensate it for that loss or damage.
In F.G. Minter, finance charges were direct if such the charges are incurred
because of the interruption during the short period allowed by the contract for
making the application. In Department Of The Environment v Farrans, when the
interest or financing charges it suffered loss or damage through the employer's failure
to pay any of the deducted sums on the due date, and that a reasonable person in the
employer's position would have contemplated such loss or damage, such finance
charges were direct. Both cases show that finance charges arising naturally can be
clam under the first limb of Hadley v Baxendale.
4.2.3 Overheads
Property And Land Contractors Ltd v Alfred Mcalpine Homes North Ltd.10
Property and Land Contractors Ltd (PLC) made a contract in April 1989 with Alfred
McAlpine Homes North Ltd to construct 22 houses near York. The contract was on
JCT 1980 terms. On 16 June 1989 McAlpine gave PLC an instruction to postpone
10 47 ConLR 74
the works under cl 23 and PLC submitted a claim under cl 26. The matter was
referred to arbitration and the arbitrator made two interim awards. It was against the
second interim award that the present appeal was brought. PLC was a subsidiary of
Property and Land Securities Ltd (PLS). PLC's practice was to contract primarily
with PLS and normally to carry out one substantial contract at a time. It argued that
the delay caused by the cl 23 instruction meant that it was unable to undertake any
other substantial work and that it was unable to commence another contract on which
it would have earned profit. The arbitrator made findings in relation to direct loss or
expense arising out of head office overheads and small plant. McAlpine appealed.
The court held that Loss in respect of overheads in the period of delay must
be proved to be caused by reduction in turnover which was directly attributable to the
delay. PLC's fixed overheads were peculiar to it and were directly incurred by the
situation in which it found itself. It was justifiable for the arbitrator to have treated
some part of the fixed overheads as tantamount to additional supervisory costs which
would not have been incurred but for the delay. PLC was in effect a single contract
company. Therefore, the fixed overhead expenditure on the delayed contract
necessarily should be regarded as direct expense due to the progress of the work
being materially affected by the main question. The appeal as to head office
overheads should therefore be dismissed.
Generally, there are no critical issues relating overhead expense to
remoteness of damage. However, overhead expense is considered arising naturally in
the course of running a business or operation. The issues usually arose is to proved
the overheads caused by reduction in turnover, and proper method of calculation.
4.2.4 Loss of Productivity
Tate & Lyle Food and Distribution Ltd v Greater London Council and
another.11 The first defendant's construction of ferry terminals on the bank of the
River Thames, carried out with the consent and approval of the second defendant, the
river authority, caused siltation over the bed of the river which diminished the depth
of the water up river from the terminals. When the first defendant failed to dredge it
away, the plaintiffs, who carried on business up river as sugar refiners and
lightermen respectively at premises which included wharves, jetties and berths,
incurred over a period of seven years from 1967 to 1974 dredging costs amounting to
£50,000 in removing the siltation. At the trial of the action in 1980 the judge held,
inter alia, that the defendants were liable in negligence to the plaintiffs for their
failure to dredge away the siltation. The quantum of the damages was adjourned for
further hearing. The parties then reached agreement on quantum, namely that the
plaintiffs should recover £50,000 for their expenditure on dredging costs, but the
defendants disputed the plaintiffs' claim for damages for managerial and supervisory
resources expended in remedying the siltation, on the ground that that was not a
recoverable head of damage. There was evidence that the plaintiffs had in fact
expended managerial time in taking measures to remedy the siltation which
otherwise might have been spent on their trading activities but, although it would
have been possible for them to keep office records of the time so spent, they had not
done so.
The court held that the expenditure of managerial time in remedying an
actionable wrong done to a trading concern could properly form the subject matter of
special damage which could be claimed by the concern. However, by failing to
11 [1981] 3 All ER 716
record the managerial time spent on remedying the siltation, the plaintiffs had failed
to prove the special damage under that head, and in the absence of proof the court
would not speculate on quantum by awarding as the damages under that head a
percentage of the plaintiffs' total damages. Accordingly, the claim for damages for
the expenditure of managerial time in remedying the siltation failed.
This is a case in tort, however, the claim for expenditure of managerial
time resemble loss of productivity claim. Generally, there are no critical issues of
loss of productivity relating to remoteness of damages. The issues usually arose is to




This is the final chapter which summarizes the finding of the research in
accordance with the research objective. Problems encountered during the research as
well as the recommendations of future research are also discussed in this chapter.
5.2  Summary of Research Findings
Base on our objectives which is to:
1. To determine whether direct loss and expense is related to remoteness
of damages.
2.  To determine which limb of rule of Hadley v Baxendale, each head of
 claims lies under.
Conclusion can be made that direct loss and expense is closely related to
remoteness of damages. For the relationship of each head of claims with Hadley v
Baxendale:
  Loss of Profit falls under both limbs of Hadley v Baxendale. Besides
loss of profit considered arising naturally in that particular business, loss of profit
under special circumstance such as in a contract with a third party is claimable,
provided there is contemplation at the beginning about such arrangement.
  Finance Charges falls under first limb of Hadley v Baxendale. Finance
charges were direct if such the charges are incurred because of the interruption by
employer.
  Overhead falls under the first limb of Hadley v Baxendale. If
particular head office costs are proved to have been increased by a contract’s delay,
they are recoverable as they are considered arising naturally in the course of running
a business or operation.
Loss of Productivity falls under the first limb of Hadley v
Baxendale. Loss of Productivity considered arising naturally and claimable if there is
record.
5.3  Problem Encountered During Research
Constraint and insufficiency of time was the main and only problem
encountered when writing up the report for this research. Only eight (8) weeks’ time
was available for this research and hence every process has been carried out in a very
fast manner, especially during the data collection process, which involved collecting
and sorting court cases from different law journals. This limitation led to less cases
being found to support the findings, especially those cases decided in Malaysia
courts. If there were more time given, the study can be done in more comprehensive
and thorough way.
5.4  Further Studies
Direct loss and expense is a very important element in construction
contract. However, due to the imbalance relationship between employer and
contractor, direct loss and expense is taken lightly and often treated as a mere
“business decision”. Thus, further studies can be done such as:
1. Circumstances where direct loss and expense is claimable.
2.  Methods to improve contract management to claim direct loss and
expense.
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DISRUPTION: COUNTING THE COST
The term disruption is one synonymous with construction claims. But what
does it really mean, and how can it be properly demonstrated and evaluated?
Disruption in its simplest sense is the loss of productivity; a reduction in
the output of construction resources, those being, primarily, labour and plant.
Disruption costs may be distinguished from prolongation costs by virtue of the fact
that the latter are a function of time. Time related costs normally represent the costs
of the contractor’s site establishment, site management, common plant, etc. and are
said to be largely critically dependent; they arise where there is a delay to the critical
path to the works. Thus, once a delay has been established and entitlement to an
extension of time for that delay recognised, demonstrating an entitlement to
prolongation costs incurred as consequence of the delay is usually a matter of
course.
Disruption costs on the other hand are essentially production related and as
such are often very difficult to prove. One difficulty is that there are so many
variables involved; risks which the contractor has taken on board in preparing his
tender and, in particular, estimating the productivity level of his resources. Such
variables might include poor workmanship, inclement weather, poor supervision,
plant breakdowns, poor quality or damaged materials, etc. With all these factors
affecting construction output, how is a contractor able to demonstrate and prove on a
balance of probabilities (the civil standard of proof) that his reduced productivity
resulted from events which were the responsibility of the employer?
This is not an easy task. As readers will have been advised time and time
again, a principle key to success is in this regard is records, records and more records.
But not just any records.
Some contractors have sensibly implemented the use a of daily ‘disruption
schedules’ to record disruption at site level as it occurs. These schedules record, for
instance, that access to a particular area was not available on the date or in the
condition specified and that as a result, labour and plant were left idle for a noted
period of time; or that a site instruction was received which required labour to be
diverted to another task resulting in noted periods additional demobilisation / re-
mobilisation time. These schedules are usually completed by the site / section
foreman, copied to the employer’s agent and used by the site management as the
basis for timely submission of notifications.
As an alternative to a bespoke disruption schedule, better use could be
made of site records which are required under the particular contract. For instance,
most  contracts require the main contractor / sub-contractor to maintain daily
records of labour and plant utilised on site. These are often required to be submitted
on a daily / weekly basis to be incorporated in to the employer's agent’s “Site Diary”
as an agreed record and can prove to be an essential aid to establishing by way of
contemporaneous documentation what work was taking place when, and what
resources were utilised in the process.
However, more could be done to improve the usefulness of these records as
a means of supporting a disruption claim. For instance, with minor modification they
can be transformed into a disruption record, highlighting matters which have
occurred on the particular day which have caused labour and plant to stand idle or
otherwise impacted upon their outputs, and noting the productivity lost as a
result.  Further, by directly inputting the site data into an electronic version of the site
record on computer (as opposed to manually transposing to a hard version) this
valuable information can be used to assist with the fast and accurate production of
as-built programming information, saving time and cost.
If the above procedures are followed many of the difficulties often
experienced in demonstrating the effects of disruptive events will have been
eliminated. Cost details of the affected resource (as determined from the
contemporaneous records of down time, etc.) may then be compiled from the site
accounting records. On this basis any resulting disruption claim will be in respect of
actual cost or loss and expense incurred and reference to actual tender allowances
(which may have been unrealistic) will have been avoided.
However, not all projects are managed so efficiently as we would wish and
although disruptive events might have been notified, in the absence of
contemporaneous records as to the effect of those events, contractor’s are often left
with trying to establish a claim for disruption on the basis of what they allowed in
their tender for an activity, compared with what that activity finally cost; in other
words they are left with making a ‘global claim’. This approach is fraught with
difficulties and, in addition to the more obvious problem of linking cause and effect,
demonstrating that tender output allowances were reasonable for an activity in the
first place may prove to be a major stumbling block.
One method which has been accepted by the courts is to show that on parts
of the works where a similar activity was not subject to the disruption claimed, the
contractor achieved his planned output, thereby demonstrating that, but for the events
notified, the additional cost of performing the activity would not have arisen. This in
essence was the approach taken in How Engineering Services Ltd v Linder Ceilings,
Floors and Partitions plc (1999) 64 CLR 67 where, in order to demonstrate that the
disruption costs claimed had arisen from the matters pleaded, reliance was made on
the productivity achieved during the installation of ceilings within parts of the works
which were not disrupted. The productivity in these areas proved to be consistent
with the tendered allowances and this finding of fact contributed to the success of the
claim.
A similar approach was accepted by the courts in Whittal Builders
Company Ltd v Chester-Le-Street District Council (1985) 11 CLR 40 within which
the evaluation of disruption was carried out on the basis of a comparison of
productivity prior to the disruptive events taking place, compared with that achieved
during the period of disruption.  In this case the comparison of outputs was made by
assessment of sums certified within interim payment certificates.
Therefore, whilst there is no substitute for accurate, contemporaneous
records of the actual effect of the disrupting event (and contractor’s should strive to
ensure that such are maintained) it will nevertheless be comforting for contractors to
know that in certain circumstances alternative methods of demonstrating and
evaluating disruption have been accepted by the courts.
Stephen W Rae
LLB(Hons), BSc(Hons), MRICS, FCIArb
Director
James R Knowles (Singapore) Pte Ltd
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Indirect and Consequential Loss
Introduction
It is common practice in international standard form EPC contracts (such
as ENAA and FIDIC) to refer to both “indirect” and “consequential” loss or damage
in exclusion of liability clauses.
For example, Clause 17.6 of the FIDIC Silver Book provides:
?Neither Party shall be liable to the other Party for loss of use of any Works, loss of
profit, loss of any contract or for any indirect or consequential loss or damage which
may be suffered by the other Party in connection with the Contract, other than
under?? (our emphasis)
This article explains why there is no legal difference between the words
“indirect” and “consequential” in exclusion of liability clauses. It also explains how
parties should interpret these words in commercial negotiations.
Legal Analysis
In Croudace v Cawoods1, the English Court of Appeal stated that:
?The word ?consequential? does not cover any loss which directly and
naturally results in the ordinary course of events...?
Croudace followed the Court of Appeal decision in Millars Machine Co
Ltd v David Way & Son2. In Millars, Maugham J stated:
?On the question of damages, the word ?consequential? had come to mean
?not directly?, and the damages recovered by the defendant on the counterclaim
arose directly from the plaintiff?s breach of contract??
In Millars, Lord Justice Roche stated:
?That the damages recovered by the defendants on the counterclaim were
not merely ?consequential?, but resulted directly and naturally from the plaintiff?s
breach of contract.?
Croudace has been followed recently by the Court of Appeal in Deepak
Fertilisers and Petrochemical Corporation v Davy McKee (London) Ltd and ICI
Chemicals & Polymers Ltd3. This approach was also adopted in a more recent
decision of the Court of Appeal in Hotel Services Limited v Hilton International
Hotels (UK) Limited4. In this case it was held that an exclusion clause which
excluded “any indirect or consequential loss, damages or liability” clearly used
“consequential” as a synonym for “indirect” (at paragraphs 8 and 16).
On the basis of these Court of Appeal decisions, it is unlikely there is any
distinction between the words “indirect” and “consequential” in the context of an
exclusion of liability clause. This view is further supported by the American
construction law text Proving and Pricing Construction Claims (1990). At page 401-
2, the authors distinguish between “direct damages” and “consequential damages”.
The well known case of Hadley v Baxendale5 provides that where a party to
a contract is in breach, the damages which the other party is entitled to falls under
two limbs, namely, damages such as may fairly and reasonably be considered:
• to arise naturally (ie according to the usual course of things) from such a
breach of contract (first limb); or
• to be in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract,
as the probable result of the breach of contract (second limb).
In the context of contractual exclusion of liability clauses for indirect or
consequential loss or damage, both Croudace and Millars support the view that the
term “consequential” is confined to the second limb of the rule in Hadley v
Baxendale. On this view, the term “indirect or consequential” loss or damage would
not include any loss which arises naturally upon the breach, but would include loss or
damage which was in the contemplation of both parties, at the time the contract was
made, as the probable result of its breach.
Accordingly, while the construction of each exclusion clause will depend
on its own words and context, generally indirect or consequential loss and damage is
likely to be loss or damage which falls within the second limb of Hadley v Baxendale.
It is loss which is in some way less direct or more remote than loss or damage which
remains recoverable under the first limb.
In practice, however, it is often very difficult to determine whether a loss
falls within the first or second limb of Hadley v Baxendale. It is important to
understand that claims for loss of profit, while commonly thought to fall within the
category of indirect or consequential loss (ie the second limb of Hadley v Baxendale),
will often fall within the first limb (namely, loss which is a direct and natural
consequence of the breach). The recent cases of Hotel Services Limited v Hilton
International Hotels (UK) Limited and Deepak Fertilisers v Davy McKee are clear
examples of this position.
In Deepak, loss of profits and wasted overheads incurred during the
reconstruction of a plant were held by the Court of Appeal to be direct rather than
indirect or consequential damages.
In the case of Saint Line v Richardsons, Westgarth6, the court held that a
loss of profit claimed by the owners of a vessel was direct and immediate, and not
“indirect or consequential” and was recoverable as falling outside the relevant
exclusion clause.
Given the above cases, parties must ensure that an exclusion of liability
clause is carefully drafted and expressly excludes liability for the particular category
of loss, for example, loss of use, loss of production or loss of profit as they may be
construed as direct loss if not specified.
Conclusion
Although there is no legal distinction between the words “indirect” and
“consequential” in exclusion of liability clauses, both terms are commonly used in
this context. For example, the exclusion of liability clause in ENAA 1996 (GC 30.2)
refers to “any indirect, special or consequential loss or damage”. Similarly, the
exclusion of liability clause in the FIDIC Silver Book (Sub Clause 17.6) refers to
“indirect or consequential loss or damage”.
For the purposes of commercial negotiations, parties should interpret the
term “indirect or consequential loss or damage” as loss or damage falling within the
second limb of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale. That is loss or damage which does
not arise naturally in the usual course of things from the breach of contract, but loss
which may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties,
at the time they made the contract, as the probable results of the breach of it.
1 [1978] 8 BLR 20
2 (1934) 40 Com.Cas.204
3 [1999] Lloyd’s Rep 387
4 [2000] BLR 235
5 (1854) 9 Ex 341
6 [1940] 2 K.B. 99
